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INTRODUCTION
Art as investment has become an increasingly prominent feature of the art
world.1 It is now common for investors to collect pieces based largely on their
anticipated future resale value rather than their aesthetic value.2 Surveys have
found that half of art collectors consider investment returns to be an important
motivation for their art purchases,3 and 88% of wealth managers think art and
1. NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET
153 (2011) ("The watershed study of historical art prices is Gerald Reitlinger's The Economics
of Taste, published in three volumes between 1961 and 1970 .... [He concluded that] '[b]y
the middle of the 1950s, after two world wars, a world financial depression, and a world wave
of currency inflation, "art as an investment" had lost any stigma that it might once have
possessed."'); Kyle Sommer, The Art of Investing in Art, J.P. MORGAN (2013), http://www
.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/jpmorgan/is/thought/magazine/3Q2013/art [http://perma
.cc/6H5R-JW9E] ("Art has long been considered an i vestment of passion .... Only recently
has art investing been viewed through the lens of modem portfolio theory . . . .").
2. See Sommer, supra note 1 ("In the 2011 RBC/Capgemini Global Wealth Management Finan-
cial Advisor Survey, 42 percent of advisors believe their [high net worth] clients invest in art
primarily for its potential to gain in value.").
3. Art & Finance Report 2017, DELOITTE 142 (2017) [hereinafter DELOITTE 2017], http://www2
.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/artandfinance/lu-art
-finance-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3VS-M4JY]. In addition, 36% of art collectors said
that portfolio diversification is an important motivation for them when buying art, and 21%
said that hedging inflation is an important motivation. Id. 86% of art professionals said that
their clients buy art and collectibles for emotional reasons but also focus on investment value.
Id. at 23.
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collectibles should be included as part of a wealth management offering,4 up
from 55% in 2O14.s
Heightened interest in art investing, along with growing interest in investing
in pleasure assets more generally,6 has led to a boom in the art market despite
conflicting accounts regarding the attractiveness of returns on art investment.7
According to a recent study, the global art market has exploded over the last ten
years, nearly doubling in size.8 This boom is driven not only by U.S. investors,
4. Id. at 98. Fifty-four percent of wealth managers ee art as a way to safeguard value. Id. at 23.
5. Art & Finance Report 2016, DELOITTE 54 (2016) [hereinafter DELOITTE 2016], http://www2
.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/fnancial-services/artandfinance/lu-en
-artandfinancereport-21o42o16.pdf [http://perma.cc/78U7-GXQD] (finding that 72% of art
collectors are buying art for collecting purposes, but with an investment view).
6. "Pleasure assets" (e.g., art, wine, and classic cars) now represent about lo% of the net assets
of wealthy individuals. Id. at 83.
7. See, e.g., DELOITTE 2016, supra note 5, at io6 ("Based on the Mei Moses[] family of fine art
indexes the most recent 20-year (1995-2015) Compound Annual Return (CAR) for art was
5.26 percent, below the S&P~oo total return of 8.33 percent. Post-war & contemporary and
traditional Chinese works of art delivered compound annual returns of 10.71 percent and 9.13
percent respectively- above the performance compared with U.S. equities in the last twenty
years .... In addition to return, relative risk is another important measure of financial perfor-
mance .... [T]he S&P~oo Total Return Index has been more volatile than all of the art indices
over the last 20 years."); Sommer, supra note 1 ("Though calculation methodologies, sample
data and time periods vary, most studies show that over long periods of time art prices have
trended upwards, kept pace with inflation and, in several studies, have outperformed more
traditional asset classes such as equities and bonds over certain time periods."). But see Arthur
Korteweg et al., Research: Is Art a Good Investment?, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. Bus. (Oct. 21,
2013), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/research-art-good-investment [http://perma
.cc/V38Q-5WWV] ("The returns of fine art have been significantly overestimated, and the
risk, underestimated. Our research, based on the most complete auction database, BASI
(Blouin Art Sales Index), shows the true annual return of art as an asset class over 1972 to
2010 was closer to 6.5%, instead of the io% that the index shows. Moreover, holding an art
fund in your portfolio does not increase the chances that the portfolio will outperform.").
8. Eileen Kinsella, What Does TEFAF 2016 Art Market Report Tell Us About the GlobalArt Trade?,
ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016), http://news.artnet.com/market/tefaf-2o16-art-market-report
-443615 [http://perma.cc/9966-KNNA] ("Using data from dealers, auction houses, art and
antique collectors, art and financial databases (including artnet), and industry experts, [cul-
tural economist Clare] McAndrew tracks the growth of the global art market from year to
year, analyzes regional performance, art buyers and world wealth, and examines the economic
impact of the art trade on the global economy"); see also Sommer, supra note 1 (noting that
the size of the global art market, according to TEFAF, is $56 billion). Note, however, that
TEFAF dramatically revised its art market size estimate downward in 2017 to $45 billion after
changing its methodology to include fewer galleries. Shellie Karabell, just How Big Is the Art
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but also investors from emerging markets like China.9 Given that the population
of ultra-high-net-worth individuals, the main players in art investing, is ex-
pected to grow by 43% by 2026 (in large part due to increases in wealth in emerg-
ing economies), the global art market is likely to continue to expand. o
Why have these investors been drawn to the art market? Four features of art
have made it an attractive investment option. First, although the aggregate long-
term rates of return in the art market tend to trail those in the stock market,"
investing in art can be a valuable component of a portfolio diversification strat-
egy.12 Some studies have found that art prices have a low correlation with other
asset classes, and may thus outperform the stock market during economic down-
turns." Second, during periods of high inflation, when the purchasing power of
9. In fact, in 2011, China overtook the United States as the largest auction market in the world,
with 30% of the total international trade. NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPO-
RARY ART IN A GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET 217 (2014). While the United States is still the
world's largest overall art market, with a 38% market share by value, China has taken second
place with 24%, surpassing the U.K. and France in the last decade. CLARE McANDREw, ART
MARKET REPORT 2014, TEFAF 22 (2014).
10. DELOITTE 2017, supra note 3, at 41.
n1. See DELOITTE 2016, supra note 5, at io6 (noting that the 20-year and 50-year returns on fine
art were lower than the returns on the S&P5oo).
12. See Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, Art as an Investment and the Underperformance of Master-
pieces, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1656, 1666 (2002) ("Our art index also has less volatility and much
lower correlation with other assets as found in previous studies. As a result, a diversified port-
folio of artworks may play a somewhat more important role in portfolio diversification."); see
also Jeremy Eckstein, Art Funds as Asset Class, in FINE ART AND HIGH FINANCE: EXPERT ADVICE
ON THE ECONOMICS OF OWNERSHIP 136, 136 (Clare McAndrew ed., 2010) (" [A] portfolio that
includes art along with its more conventional assets offers risk-adjusted rates of return that
are superior to portfolios without art."). In fact, 36% of art collectors stated that portfolio
diversification is an important aspect of buying art, and 48% of wealth managers believe that
asset diversification is a strong argument for including art in traditional wealth management
and private banking. DELOITTE 2017, supra note 3, at 142,116-17. But see Andrew C. Worthing-
ton & Helen Higgs,Art as Investment: Risk, Return and Portfolio Diversification in MajorPainting
Markets, 44 AcCT. & FIN. 257, 269 (2004) ("It is clear that even though art markets have very
low and even negative correlations with financial market assets, their risk-return characteris-
tics are so inferior to equity and debt markets that they are never included in the efficient
set.... However, it is the case that as the number of assets increases the risk of the portfolio
collapses to the individual covariances, such that the creation of a portfolio with much finer
detail than the broad asset classes used here should illustrate at least some diversification ben-
efits.").
13. DELOITTE 2016, supra note 5, at 107 ("The negative or close-to-zero correlation factor between
the annual percentage changes in the different art categories and stock indexes for the last 20
and so years indicates that art may play a positive role in portfolio diversification."); Sommer,
supra note 1 (" [S] tudies show that art can offer long-term return potential that is uncorrelated
with other asset classes. . . . Undeterred by a rough economic environment in recent years,
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currency is falling, art acts as a store of value. 14 Third, with the number of ultra-
high-net-worth individuals increasing worldwide, art prices have the potential
to grow tremendously, generating large returns for investors." Finally, certain
subsets of the art market have seen very large returns in recent years, increasing
public attention on the potential of art for investment. For example, Post-War
art6 has seen a 308% increase in price indices over the past decade.1 7 Although
the art market initially floundered in the wake of the financial crisis, these factors
have all contributed to generate the recent growth in art as investment.
collectors globally are paying record sums for top works."); Clare McAndrew & Rachel Camp-
bell, Art Risk, in FINE ART AND HIGH FINANCE, supra note 12, at 87; see also HOROWITZ, supra
note 1, at 157-59 (discussing the role of artwork in a diverse portfolio); Rachel Campbell &
Joshua Pullan, Diversification intoArtMutualFunds, in DIvERSIFICATIONAND PORTFOLIOMAN-
AGEMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS 1, 4-5 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2007) (noting that art may be
part of an "optimal portfolio allocation"). The degree of correlation, however, varies by art
market. For example, a study of emerging art markets found that while the Russian art market
has a positive correlation with most common financial assets, the Chinese art market has a
negative correlation, making it more suitable for hedging. Roman Kraeussl & Robin Logher,
Emerging Art Markets, 11 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 301, 303 (2010).
14. Sommer, supra note 1 ("The obvious monetary benefit is the opportunity to gain a return on
investment, though investors also recognize art as a way to store value, to hedge inflation and
to diversify their portfolio allocation."). One of the first art funds, the British Rail Pension
Fund (BRPF), diversified its investments with fine art in an effort to hedge against a period
of rapid inflation and rising interest rates. Campbell & Pullan, supra note 13, at 5. Fifty-four
percent of wealth managers ee art as a means to safeguard value. DELOITTE 2017, supra note
3, at 117.
15. Sommer, supra note 1 ("Market paradigms have shifted dramatically over the last several dec-
ades, as newly created wealth in emerging markets such as China, Russia and the Middle East
has increased the number of participants in the art trade, giving the market greater resili-
ency."); Art & Finance Report 2014, DELOITTE 21 (2014) [hereinafter DELOITTE 2014], http://
www.slideshare.net/AlloWebb/deloitte-arttactic-artfinancereport2014 [http://perma.cc
/2WV2-4HE2] (" [T] he growth in sales of art and collectibles has been fuelled by the globali-
sation of the art market and an exceptional increase in wealth, especially in new growth mar-
kets such as Asia, the Middle East and Latin America."); id. at 26 ("According to the annual
World Wealth Report, the population of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) has increased
from 7 million individuals in 2003 with total wealth of an estimated US$27.2 trillion, to 13.7
million individuals in 2013 with total wealth of US$52.6 trillion (an increase of 93.3% in total
wealth). The Asia-Pacific region has seen particularly strong growth, from 1.57 million indi-
viduals in 2003 with total wealth of US$5.7 trillion to 4.3 million individuals in 2013 with
wealth of US$14.2 trillion (up 149% in the last ten years).").
16. "Post-War art" in this case refers to works by artists born between 1920 and 1945. The Art
Market in 2o15, ARTPRICE.COM Nota Bene (2016), http://imgpublic.artprice.com/pdf
/rama2ol6_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7YR-KSAJ]. The relevant war is World War II. See, e.g.,
Post-War American Art, ARTsY, http://www.artsy.net/gene/post-war-american-art [http://
perma.cc/57DY-SYRA]; Post-War European Art, ARTsY, http://www.artsy.net/gene/post
-war-european-art [http://perma.cc/4GHN-EC5X].
17. The Art Market in 2015, supra note 16, at 12-13.
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The benefits of investing in the high-end art market, however, are largely
only available to very wealthy individuals. Although artistic patronage has
shifted over time from private commissions to institutional funding," and tech-
nology-driven online art businesses have shown the potential to lower transac-
tion costs and barriers to entry,9 art investing generally still requires connections
to the art world and the employment of costly middlemen.20 Moreover, the fun-
damental vehicle for art investment remains the same: a single investor must put
up enough capital to purchase an entire piece of artwork. Because a well-diver-
sified portfolio requires that investors buy many pieces to mitigate idiosyncratic
risk, art investing is almost exclusively the province of the wealthy. Moreover,
the illiquidity of art as an investment product makes it less attractive to less
wealthy investors who are less able to lock up their capital into assets they might
have difficulty liquidating in the near future.2 1 That limited investor pool means
that less wealthy individuals who would otherwise want to take advantage of
art's financial and aesthetic value are excluded from the market, preventing the
art market from reaching its full cultural and economic potential. As it has been
for much of history, art investment is still largely restricted to a select group of
elite investors.
A potential exception to these general limitations is art investment vehicles.
Art investment vehicles are entities that allow groups of investors to pool their
resources and reap the financial rewards of art as investment without individu-
ally owning the underlying artworks. One type of an art investment vehicle is an
art fund. Art funds emerged in the 1970s and allow investors to pool their money
is. See Stewart Dearing, Cultural Critic Takes on Modern-Day Art Patronage, BROWN DAILY
HERALD (Nov. 3, 2o6), http://www.browndailyherald.com/2o6/11/o3/cultural-critic
-takes-on-modernday-art-patronage [http://perma.cc/HSY5-8YT8] (describing the shift
from individual patronage to patronage from corporations and governments).
19. DELOITTE 2014, supra note 15, at 15 ("[C]ollectors and art professionals both indicated in-
creased confidence in the future of consumer-to-consumer and dealer-to-dealer sales plat-
forms for the online art industry.... 77% of art collectors and 69% of art professionals believe
that the online art auction market will become one of the winning business models.").
20. The premiums paid to professional art buyers have "increased steadily ... since the early
1990s and can account for upwards of 10-20 percent per transaction. . . ." HOROWITZ, supra
note 1, at 171.
21. Income risk and the expectation of uture borrowing constraints reduce people's willingness
to invest in risky assets, including illiquid assets. Luigi Guiso et al., Income Risk, Borrowing
Constraints, and Portfolio Choice, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 158, 158 (1996). Also, lower incomes and
lower net worth have been empirically found to correlate with lower shares of risky assets. Id.
at 165-66. This is "consistent with the presence of fixed transaction and information costs in
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to invest in a collection of art.22 Art funds buy a set of pieces, store them until a
maturation date, sell them, and then distribute the profits to investors. During
this time - generally between five and seven years23 - the art fund might loan the
pieces out to its investors or to institutions,24 but otherwise the pieces are com-
pletely removed from the market.25 The benefits of art funds are that they allow
investors with little knowledge of or connections to the art market to invest in
the art market without dealing with the selection, maintenance, and promotion
of pieces.
Despite these advantages, however, art funds still suffer from illiquidity, in-
accessibility, and weak returns. Most art funds are structured like private equity
funds, with high fees and long-term lock-ups.26 Modeling themselves after other
private equity funds, art funds typically charge a management fee of 1-3% annu-
ally and a performance fee of 20% of the profits.27 In addition, with required
minimum investments as high as $1 million, participation in art funds is still
generally restricted to very wealthy individual investors. 28 Moreover, the art-
22. While individuals have been acquiring art in art clubs or similar collectives for investment
purposes for centuries, the BRPF was the first to formally adopt the rubric of what we would
today call an art investment fund. In 1974, a portion of the BRPF's capital was invested in over
2,500 works of art during a six-year period. Sommer, supra note 1. See generally What Are Art
Funds, ART FUND Ass'N LLC, http://www.artfundassociation.com/_what are art funds
/basic-af.html [http://perma.cc/A5U4-5NV5].
23. Characteristics of a Typical Art Fund Investment, ART FUND Ass'N LLC, http://www.artfund
association.com/_what areartjfunds/characteristics.html [http://perma.cc/8QCC-J5XJ].
This is similar to the standard lock-in period for private equity funds of five to ten years. John
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Reg-
ulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1246 (2014).
24. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 15o.
25. According to Philip Hoffman, the CEO of The Fine Art Group (formerly The Fine Art Fund
Group), one of the largest art funds, 90% of the fund's holdings are in storage. Daniel Grant,
ArtMarket'sBoom in Off-the-Wall Storage, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB118245527806143800 [http://perma.cc/HD8C-LZMZ]. Similarly, inves-
tors in the British Fine Art Fund rarely see the Fund's works of art, which are stored at Ge-
neva's free port. Imogen Foulkes, Geneva's Art Storage Boom in Uncertain Times, BBC (Jan. 2,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-2o696126 [http://perma.cc/88K4-E7CJ].
26. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 149, 185.
27. ALESSIA ZORLONI, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART: MARKETS, STRATEGIES, AND
STARDOM 151 (2013) (ebook); WhatAre Art Funds, supra note 22.
28. One of the most prominent funds, the Fine Art Group, has a minimum investment of
$500,ooo to $1 million for its six funds, with only 30 to 40 individuals and institutions in-
vesting in each fund. Jessica M. Curley, Art Investment Funds: The Basics, ITS ART L. (May 19,
2015), http://itsartlaw.com/2o15/o5/19/art-investment-funds-intro [http://perma.cc/49EJ
-V4LJ]. The much smaller Collectors Fund had an entry price of $1oo,ooo and ioo investors.
Daniel Grant, Dollars on the Wall? Art Funds Boom Along with Auction Houses, OBSERVER
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fund market remains a very small portion of the overall art market; out of the
estimated $64 billion art market,2 9 art funds only manage around $834 million
of assets.o The art-fund market has been shrinking every year since its high of
$2.1 billion in 2012." Thus, while art funds have increased access to the art mar-
ket to those with few connections to or little knowledge of the art market, their
impact has been very limited.
Aside from doing relatively little to expand access to the art market, art funds
have had limited financial success. The British Rail Pension Fund (BRPF),
which started investing in art in the 1970s, is usually cited as one of the first art
funds and has been the only large institutional art fund to date. In 1974, faced
with high rates of inflation and poorly performing stock markets in the U.K., the
BRPF decided to diversify its holdings by investing 3% (around $70 million) of
its portfolio in fine art.32 After liquidating its art holdings in 2000," the fund
achieved an average annual rate of return of 4% (in real terms) on its art collec-
tion, though mainly as a result of highly profitable investments in impressionist
artworks that were fortuitously sold at the peak of the prices in that market.34
Moreover, the U.K. stock market ended up having a massive recovery, with the
FTSE-Actuaries Index rising from 61.92 in 1974 to over 3,000 in 2000."s Alt-
hough the BRPF's investment in art succeeded in its stated goal of producing a
real return after inflation, in hindsight the fund would have performed much
better had it not invested in art.3 6 Thus, although the BRPF is often cited as one
(May 14, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://observer.com/2o14/o5/dollars-on-the-wall-a-booming-art
-market-attracts-investors [http://perma.cc/G49F-YSC6]. According to the president of the
Art Fund Association, " [r]ecent market estimates indicate that [art] funds manage between
$700 million and $1 billion." Id.
29. Kinsella, supra note 8.
30. DELOITTE 2017, supra note 3, at 182 (noting that this is a conservative estimate). The United
States and European art investment fund markets are estimated to have a combined $461 mil-
lion under management, while the Chinese art investment fund market alone is estimated to
have $373 million. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jeremy R. Howard,Art Market: The 20th Century, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 10, 2017),
http://www.britannica.com/topic/art-market/The-20th-century [http://perma.cc/4J6F
-3QDA].
33. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 155.
34. Id.
35. Jeremy Eckstein, Investing in Art: Art as an Asset Class, in THE ART BUSINESS 69, 77-78 (lain
Robertson & Derrick Chong eds., 2008).
36. In fact, the fund might have performed better if it had allocated the $70 million (L4o million)
into a Post Office Savings Account. Peter Cannon-Brookes, Art Investment and the British Rail
Pension Fund, 15 MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 4o6, 407 (1996). Nonetheless, the fund's
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of the first success stories in institutional art investment,7 its success was very
limited at best.
Most attempts to create large, diversified art funds, however, have not expe-
rienced even this modest level of success, instead dissolving due to internal scan-
dals, failing to raise sufficient funds, or liquidating their holdings with losses."
One of the few extant firms to have weathered these challenges successfully is
the Fine Art Group (previously known as the Fine Art Fund), which has raised
over $500 million." But even the Fine Art Group's returns have been disappoint-
ing, with the firm recently reporting a return of around 5% on its latest fund.4 0
Overall, the limited and weak track record of the art-fund market has under-
mined its attractiveness to investors.4 1
Besides art funds, another form of art investment vehicles is art exchanges.
Art exchanges allow less affluent investors to buy and sell highly liquid shares in
the resale value of collections of artworks owned by companies that transact on
the exchange.42 The idea behind art exchanges is that they mimic public stock
investment in art arguably did serve to diversify the portfolio, as has been stressed by some
scholars. Campbell & Pullan, supra note 13, at 6.
37. Kevin Radell, The State of Art Funds, ARTNET (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.artnet.com
/magazineus/news/radell/radell9-14-o5.asp [http://perma.cc/W34C-ARAY] ("Most articles
these days that fan the flames of the booming potential for art funds, and most private art
fund prospectuses, cite the impressive 11.3% annually compounded rate of return generated
by the BRPF from 1974 to 1999."); Alasdair Whyte, Art Fund Backgrounder: Three Key Exam-
ples ofArt Funds, PRIv. ART INVESTOR (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.privateartinvestor.com/art
-finance/art-fund-backgrounder-three-key-examples-of-art-funds [http://perma.cc/2ZNL
-S2ZY] (describing the British Rail Pension Fund as "a successful experiment for formal art
funds").
38. High-profile examples of failed art funds include Fernwood Sector Allocation Fund, Fern-
wood Opportunity Fund, and the Savigny Art Fund. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at app. c,
tbl. ci.
39. Anny Shaw, The Problem with Art Funds, ARTsY (Jan. 9, 2017,5:21 PM), http://www.artsy.net
/article/artsy-editorial-problem-art-funds [http://perma.cc/L5FJ-YJ4R].
40. Id.
41. Seventy-four percent of wealth managers urveyed by Deloitte said that the lack of a track
record for art funds is a main hurdle for incorporating art funds into their offerings. In addi-
tion, 59% said that the small size of the art fund market was a significant hurdle. DELOITTE
2017, supra note 3, at 191, 193.
42. Jason-Louise Graham, Art Exchange? How the International Art Market Lacks a Clear Regulatory
Framework, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MARKET: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 319,
327-29 (Valentina Vadi & Hildegard E.G.S. Schneider eds., 2014); Shane Ferro, Can Art
Exchanges Ever Make Financial Sense?, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www
.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/756o21/can-art-exchanges-ever-make-financial-sense
[http://perma.cc/UZ4A-LWCR]; Mairi Mackay, Modern Art Shares from $13 in New Art Stock
Exchange, CNN (Jan. 10, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/ol/10/art.stock
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exchanges with low barriers to entry by allowing investors to easily sell their
shares to other market participants.43 Just as stock exchanges allow investors to
buy and sell shares in companies, art exchanges allow investors to buy and sell
shares in "art management companies," which specialize in buying, managing,
and selling artworks. Unlike art funds, art exchanges do not require minimum
capital contributions and therefore are generally not limited to high-net-worth
investors." Moreover, by providing investors with a robust secondary market
for their shares, investors are not locked in for several years as they are in art
funds.
In terms of legal structures, the fundamental difference between the art fund
model and the art exchange model is that art funds have external management
structures whereas the art management companies selling shares on art ex-
changes have internal management structures. Art funds are managed by exter-
nal managers who work for a firm that manages multiple funds.45 This creates
benefits of economies of scope and scale from managers being able to manage
multiple funds and the resources of the firm being spread across these funds.46
In contrast, art management companies, like other types of companies, have
their own management teams.47 Given the important role experts and middle-
men play in the art market, the economies of scope and scale gained from sharing
human capital across funds can be very beneficial in the art market. Nonetheless,
the increased accessibility and liquidity offered by art exchanges could make
them more attractive to less affluent investors who are excluded from the art fund
market.
Art exchanges have been attempted over the past few years in the United
States, Europe, and Asia with varying degrees of success. Only one art exchange
was attempted in the United States, and it is unclear whether it ever actually
.exchange.paris/index.html_[http://perma.cc/6WTC-6QC21; Luca Poli, Art Stock Exchange,
MYTEMPLART (Oct. 26, 2016), http://news.mytemplart.com/art-stock-exchange [http://
perma.cc/N659-QCQ9].
43. See supra note 42.
44. Shares on art exchanges can be very inexpensive. See, e.g., Mackay, supra note 42.
45. This is the general idea behind what John Morley calls the "separation of funds and manag-
ers." Morley, supra note 23, at 1232.
46. Id. at 1233, 1259.
47. Funds, in contrast, have "no employees or other operational assets and may even be prohibited
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launched and made any investment offerings.48 Of the two art exchanges at-
tempted in Europe, one struggled to gain regulatory approval, while the other
suffered from insufficient investor interest.4 9 In contrast, art exchanges in China
have seen a very different problem: excessive speculation.o Two paintings on
the Tianjin Art Exchange in China skyrocketed to seventeen times their original
prices in less than three months." After the spike in value, shareholders panicked
48. The Liquid Rarity Exchange generated substantial news coverage in 2012 with its plans to
launch public art investment vehicles registered with the SEC within the next twelve to eight-
een months. See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Want To Own a Picasso? Here's Your Chance, AOL (Aug.
22, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.aol.com/2o12/o8/22/want-to-own-a-picasso-heres-your
-chance [http://perma.cc/W7LR-QSA9]; Amir Kurtovic, Saigh Developing Fund Backed by
Rare Art, Collectibles, Fine Wines, ST. Louis Bus. J. (Sept. 28, 2012, 6:oo AM), http://www
.bizjoumals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2o12/o9/28/saigh-developing-fund-backed-by-rare
.html [http://perma.cc/U8ZF-THMK]. At the time, the company was considering "several
fund proposals in the $3 5M to $1ooM range that could trade publicly . .. in the next 12 to 18
months." Nicholas Forrest, Can Shares in Art Be Successfully Traded by Liquid Rarity Exchange,
ART MKT. BLOG (Aug, 30, 2012), http://liquidrarityexchange.com/26-publishers/88-can
-shares-in-art-be-successfully-traded-by-liquid-rarity-exchange--artmarketblogcom.html
[http://perma.cc/4YQQ-6KKW]. The company would provide a technological platform that
would enable investors to easily buy and sell shares. See Kurtovic, supra. Since 2015, however,
there has been no news about the development of these funds. Curley, supra note 28 (indicat-
ing that Liquid Rarity Exchange intended to bring a product to market in the next few years).
Also, the company's website does not provide opportunities to buy shares in any funds. See
Fine Arts, LIQUID RARITY EXCHANGE, http://liquidrarityexchange.com/fine-arts.html
[http://perma.cc/SRBJ-FLDS]. The only other U.S.-based art exchange I was able to find
was Tradeable Rarities Exchange (T-REX), which was started in 2015 by the CEO of Liquid
Rarity Exchange (Mike Saigh) and the founder of Art Exchange (Pierre Naquin), a French
art exchange that closed down in 2012. See The T-REX Team, T-REX TRADING, http://www
.t-rextrading.com/team [http://perma.cc/ SWJ9-E2UJ]. The company's website does not ap-
pear to currently allow investors to invest, however, and clicking on "Get more information
About Investing" leads to the general information page. See Engage: Invest orAffiliate, T-REX
TRADING, http://www.t-rextrading.com/engage [http://perma.cc/9CEP-X9CC].
49. SplitArt, an art investment vehicle in Luxembourg, liquidated in 2012 after failing to obtain
approval from Luxembourg financial authorities. Georgina Adam, TheArt Market: Bid To Save
the Planet, FIN. TIMEs (May 17, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/eaob4a42-bbc9-11e2
-82df-ool44feab7de.html [http://perma.cc/Z9XL-R3A7]. Art Exchange, a Paris-based ex-
change, started selling shares but was still not "under the umbrella of any regulatory author-
ity. Ferro, supra, note 42. Ultimately, Art Exchange delisted the two paintings it had put on
offer after "less than 20% of the paintings' shares had been purchased by investors who were
growing impatient because trading could only begin once every share had been sold." Markets
Created To Trade Shares in Artworks Hit Obstacles, ECoNoMIST (June 24, 2013), http://www
.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2o13/o6/investing-art [ht p://perma.cc/ 52YB-V 7QE].
50. See Li Jing, Art: Experts Put Little Stock in Exchange, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 8, 2011), http://
usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2o11- 04/08/content_12291774.htm [http://perma.cc/VEK7
-VFYJ].
si. Markets Created To Trade Shares in Artworks Hit Obstacles, supra note 49.
1707
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and started umping their shares, so the exchange halted trading to avoid a mar-
ket collapse.52 In the wake of this and other instances of rampant speculation on
a variety of alternative asset exchanges, the Chinese government issued new reg-
ulations in 2011 that targeted these exchanges." While some art exchanges in
China closed in the wake of these new regulations, others continued to operate
and new ones have since emerged.54 Unlike art exchanges in the West, Chinese
art exchanges are often created through government partnerships, so while they
still face significant regulatory scrutiny, they also have some government sup-
port." As discussed above though, outside of China, art exchanges have strug-
gled to gain regulatory approval and spur sufficient investor interest. Thus,
while art exchanges have the potential to create accessible and liquid art invest-
ment opportunities, they have mostly failed to get off the ground.
Art funds and art exchanges - collectively, art investment vehicles - have
thus far faced numerous challenges, all of which have hampered their financial
success. These challenges have also prevented art investment vehicles from
achieving their potential to make art investment more accessible and liquid. Far
from making it possible for the average person to own a fraction of a Picasso,5 6
art funds have largely catered to wealthy individuals and, by adopting a private
52. Graham, supra note 42, at 328-29.
53. YONG ZHEN, CHINA'S CAPITAL MARKETS 97-98 (2013).
54. HARDY YONG XIANG & PATRICIA ANN WALKER, CHINA CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
REPORTS 135 (2013) (describing how the "State Council Decision on Rectifying All Categories
of Trading Exchanges and Effectively Preventing Financial Risk cleaned up around half
of [the] cultural equity exchanges"); see Deng Zhangyu, Art Exchange, CHINA DAILY
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/art/2o15-04/28/content_20559757
.htm [http://perma.cc/NA5C-Y87Y] (describing an art exchange that opened in China in
2015).
55. See, e.g., Li Jing, supra note 5o (explaining that " [t]hough the [Tianjin Cultural Artwork Ex-
change (TCAE)] is privately owned, TCAE said it has won special support from Tianjin mu-
nicipal government and was listed as one of the city's top 20 projects for financial innovation
in 2009,' and noting that the Shenzhen Cultural Assets and Equity Exchange was government
sponsored); Marion Maneker, China Opens Its Own Exchange for Art Sales, ART MKT. MONI-
TOR (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2o11/ol/26/china-opens-its-own
-exchange-for-art-shares [http://perma.cc/YYP5-QXBC] (describing the opening of the
"government-backed" Tianjin Cultural Artwork Exchange); Poli, supra note 42 (describing
how the Chinese State Council and People's Bank of China have begun a process of regulating
art exchanges and explaining that some exchanges are owned by local authorities); Zhangyu,
supra note 54 (describing a recent art exchange that was set up in part through a partnership
with the Beijing municipal government).
56. Much of the excitement around art investment vehicles has been the idea that they would
open art investment to most if not all investors. See, e.g., Poli, supra note 42; Kathryn Tully,
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equity model, have done little to increase liquidity and accessibility in the mar-
ket. Art exchanges, on the other hand, other than a few in China, have failed to
get off the ground.
This Comment argues that existing art investment vehicles have barely
scratched the surface of their potential. Although there are many different issues
facing art investment vehicles, this Comment focuses on their potential returns,
liquidity, and accessibility as three of the most prominent areas where art invest-
ment vehicles have untapped potential that could be unlocked through structural
changes.
Part I describes the features of the art market that make it difficult for art
investment vehicles to increase the liquidity, accessibility, and potential returns
of their offerings. Specifically, the inherent illiquidity of art as an asset, the chal-
lenges art investment vehicles face in navigating the primary market, and the
regulatory hurdles faced in opening art investment vehicles to a wider popula-
tion of investors are obstacles to the success of art investment vehicles. Part II
proposes three innovations to current art investment vehicles that address these
barriers. First, it analyzes how the development of a robust art rental market for
works owned by art investment vehicles could decouple the aesthetic and resale
values of these artworks. This change would more efficiently allocate the value
of the art, increasing the liquidity and potential returns of art investment vehicles
and allowing more people to possess artworks. Second, it proposes methods to
better align the interests of primary market players (artists and galleries) and art
investment vehicles. Works on the primary market have not been sold previously
and thus are sold directly by an artist or gallery, whereas works on the secondary
market are generally sold by one collector to another, often with the assistance
of an auction house or art dealer. Aligning the incentives between primary mar-
ket players and art investment vehicles would give the latter access to top works
on the primary art market, where pieces generally sell for less and have a greater
potential to significantly appreciate in shorter periods of time. This would not
only provide potential financial benefits to investors in the form of higher re-
turns and more liquid assets, but would also provide rare access to what is cur-
rently the least accessible segment of the art market- the high-end primary mar-
ket. Finally, by leveraging new securities registration exemptions, Section II.C
discusses how art exchanges could open up art investing to a broader array of
investors while also increasing liquidity in art ownership through the creation of
a secondary market for art securities. Through these three proposals -the crea-
tion of a robust rental market for fine art, gaining access to the primary market,
and the creation of art exchanges that leverage recent regulatory changes - the
potential benefits of art investment vehicles could be leveraged to open up the
art investment market to a broader array of investors and provide investors with
art investment products with higher potential returns and liquidity.
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I. LIMITATIONS OF ART INVESTMENT VEHICLES
Art investment vehicles have thus far had limited financial success and failed
to significantly expand the art investment market. This Part describes some of
the structural features of the art market that have hampered the success of art
investment vehicles by limiting their potential returns, liquidity, and accessibil-
ity.
The first and most fundamental challenge in the art investment market is the
lack of sufficient liquidity." Liquidity refers to the extent to which an asset or
security can be quickly bought or sold without affecting the asset's price." For
illiquid assets, there is a significant tradeoff between how quickly the piece can
be sold and at what price it can be sold -illiquid assets generally require an in-
vestor to hold the asset for a significant amount of time before they are able sell
the asset for a profit. 9 Given that art can take many years to appreciate suffi-
ciently to offset transaction, storage, and maintenance costs,6 0 art is a particularly
illiquid asset. This lack of liquidity makes art a less attractive investment option,
especially for investors with lower capital reserves, who are less able to freeze up
a large amount of capital in an asset they cannot sell in the near future.61 The
illiquidity of art as an asset makes it difficult for art investment vehicles to offer
more liquid products to investors, since providing investors with liquidity would
require selling artworks prematurely, which would likely lead to losses. Thus, art
57. See, e.g., MELANIE GERLIs, ART AS AN INVESTMENT?: A SURVEY OF COMPARATIVE ASSETS 16
(2014) ("One of the most glaring risks of owning art is the lack of liquidity in its market.").
58. Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms//liquidity.asp [http://perma
.cc/6U59-C3ZZ].
59. GERLIS, supra note 57, at 16 ("Illiquid assets either take a long time to sell or the very act of
selling them in a hurry sends their price into a tailspin.").
So. Researchers have found that after accounting for transaction costs the average return on art-
works is positive after close to four years, with returns increasing with longer holding periods.
Roman Kriiussl & Ali NasserEddine, Art as Investment: A New Perspective 19 (May 2017),
http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/macro/docs/Year/2017/papers/Art as-anInvestmentMay
2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/VVG3-UH6G]; see also Daniel Grant, Picture This Investment:
Four Investing Pros Discuss the Risks and Rewards of Buying Art, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-sort-of-return-are-you-getting-above-your-fireplace
-1387056633 [http://perma.cc/LK37-GQU3] (describing a rule of thumb of an 8% annualized
net return on art investment over a minimum holding period of five years). The optimal hold-
ing period, however, depends on the category of art. Post-War and Contemporary Art can
appreciate much faster than works in the categories of Old Masters, Impressionists, or
Modern. Roman Kraeussl, To Have and To Hold?, BLouIN ARTINFO (2013), http://www.art
-finance.com/AA 2o13_Summer.pdf [http://perma.cc/IC42W-HD8W].
61. See supra note 21.
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investment vehicles often face a tradeoff between providing investors with
greater liquidity versus greater returns.
Second, art investment vehicles generally purchase pieces on the secondary
art market, rather than on the primary market. Although most works on the pri-
mary market have little resale value,62 works sold by high-end galleries often
have a greater potential to appreciate significantly on shorter time horizons than
works on the secondary market.63 Moreover, given that the secondary market
constitutes only half of the art market, purchasing on the secondary market not
only prevents art investment vehicles from accessing the potentially more lucra-
tive primary market,64 but also constrains art investment vehicles to giving in-
vestors access to only half of the art market.65 The main reason for the limitation
of art investment vehicles to the secondary market is that the primary market has
high barriers to entry: primary market players are very wary of speculators. In
an attempt to control the price of the artist's work over time, primary market
players want to sell their best works to collectors who will keep the artworks off
the market for the foreseeable future.66 Yet, this goal is often in tension with the
incentive of art investment vehicles to sell artworks at heir peak prices. Because
of these conflicting incentives, primary market players have little motivation to
62. OLAVVELTHUIS, TALKING PRICES: SYMBOLIC MEANING OF PRICES ON THE MARKET FOR CON-
TEMPORARY ART 99 (2005) ("[M]ost artists do not have a secondary or resale market ....
After being sold on the primary market, their work will never appear on the market again.").
Given that most artwork sold on the primary market does not have a significant resale market,
this Comment focuses on the ability of art investment vehicles to access quality works from
top galleries.
63. Manuel Gerber, Primary Art Market Investments-A Safe Haven When All Else Suddenly Corre-
lates?, ART FUND TRACKERI, 7-8 (Nov. 2008), http://www.cherryartfoundation.com/pdf/Art
%2oFund%2oTracker.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8W6-7TX4] (describing how "good galleries"
are selective of their buyers, often at the expense of near-term cashflows, and also showing
how the rates of return for young artists represented by high-quality primary market galleries
are much higher in the short-term than returns in the contemporary art market as a whole).
64. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 178 (" [A]rt funds may have only limited access to the [pri-
mary] market sector where investment rewards, and risks, are arguably the greatest.").
65. See ZORLONI, supra note 27, at 58 (describing how the primary market constitutes around half
of the global art market).
66. Canice Prendergast, The Market for Contemporary Art 15-16 (2014), http://faculty.chicago
booth.edu/canice.prendergast/research/MarketContemporaryArt.pdf [http://perma.cc
/S 792-8W3N]; Chiara Zampetti Egidi, 5 Unspoken Rules of the Art Market New Collectors Need
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sell top works to art investment vehicles.6 7 In fact, gallerists arguably are more
incentivized to try to pass off less marketable pieces to art investment vehicles,68
preventing art investment vehicles from accessing the potential benefits of in-
vesting in the primary market. Consequently, art investment vehicles often must
buy pieces on the secondary art market and forgo accessing top primary market
works.6 9 Exclusion from the primary market is thus another factor inhibiting the
success of art investment vehicles.
Third, there are regulatory barriers to the creation of successful art exchanges
in the United States. The key feature of art exchanges is the ability to sell highly
liquid shares to a broad investor base, but securities regulations in the United
States have historically only provided two options for art investment vehicles:
private funds that issue restricted shares (shares with limited resale rights) to
accredited investors7 0 or public securities like shares in mutual funds or public
companies. Given the high costs and disclosure requirements of going public,
art investment vehicles in the United States have almost exclusively taken the
form of private art funds.
67. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 178 (" [E]ven if dealers and gallerists are willing to trade with
art funds in the secondary market, they may hesitate to do so in the primary market where
they have the most incentives to protect their artists' career paths.").
68. Most art funds in the past have relied primarily on contracts with outside experts to help them
with the selection, management, and selling of works. This can create conflicts of interest,
however, as outside contractors are rarely sufficiently incentivized to provide the best oppor-
tunities to the art fund. Given that many of them are gallerists and dealers themselves, they
often have incentives to pass off less marketable pieces to art funds. Although these outside
contractors usually are given some commission based on the sale price of the work, these in-
centives only partially mitigate the issue. "The main problem of [art] funds is the risk of con-
flict of interest, as in the board are often sitting dealers, auction house operators, gallery own-
ers and advisors which, in most cases, determine the market." ZORLONI, supra note 27, at 152.
In fact, Sotheby's reportedly passed along low-investment-grade assets to the BRPF when it
was acting as the fund's art advisor. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 179.
69. Brian L. Frye, New Art for the People: Art Funds & Financial Technology, 93 CHI.-ICENT L. REv.
113, 129-30 (2017) (describing how the "outsider" status of art funds makes them unable to
purchase works on the primary market and that instead, "art funds typically purchase works
on the secondary market in public auctions").
70. For individual investors, being an accredited investor requires the person to either (i) have a
net worth (or joint net worth with his/her spouse) of over $1 million or (ii) have an annual
income over $200,000 for the past two years or joint annual income with his/her spouse of
$300,000 over the past two years along with a reasonable expectation of reaching the same
income level in the current year. 17 C.F.R § 23o.501(a)(5)-(6) (2017).
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A. Lack of Liquidity
An overriding problem of art investment vehicles is that they operate in a
particularly illiquid market. Investors value liquidity because it reflects how eas-
ily they can turn their investments into cash." Illiquid assets limit investors' ac-
cess to their capital and are consequently riskier- the investor is betting that he
or she will not need to access the capital before the asset can profitably be liqui-
dated. In fact, studies have shown that illiquid assets must have higher returns
or lower prices compared to liquid assets to adequately compensate investors for
their inability to quickly turn their investments into cash.72
Compared to other assets, achieving liquidity in the art market presents a set
of unique challenges. Art is, for the most part, not fungible: each piece is unique.
This, coupled with the high prices of artworks, makes the resale market for any
individual artwork comparatively thin." The potential cohort of buyers is lim-
ited to wealthy individuals with affinity for that particular work.74 In fact, the
challenges created by this thin market explain in part the prominent role auc-
tions and art fairs play in the art market to bring art market players from around
the world together at specific times and places in order to create a viable market-
place with enough buyers and sellers. Outside of such events, it can be difficult
to find a competitive market for buying or selling artworks." Moreover, auctions
71. See, e.g., GERLIS, supra note 57, at 16 (" [L]iquidity is broadly defined as the ability to sell an
investment for cash (i.e. to liquidate it).").
72. See, e.g., id. ("In financial terms, the 'liquidity discount' means that investments that are less
liquid generally trade for less than those that are more liquid."); Yakov Amihud et al., Liquidity
and Asset Prices, 1 FOUND. &TRENDS IN FIN. 269, 271-72 (2005).
73. Thin markets are markets with a low number of buyers and sellers, leading to greater price
volatility and less liquidity. Thin Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://WWW.investopedia.com/terms
/t/thinmarket.asp [http://perma.cc/3MHP-TSN6]. If markets are thin, sellers can suffer
from "search friction." Search friction refers to the difficulty of locating a counterparty who is
willing to make a trade. In such situations, the seller "faces a tradeoff between search and
quick trading at a discount." Amihud et al., supra note 72, at 271; see also David Walker, Re-
thinking Rights ofFirst Refusal is (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 261, 1990), http://1sr.nellco.org/harvard olin/261
[http://perma.cc/4FH7-5FYK] ("The buyer's search costs are related to the pricing transpar-
ency and fungibility of the property.").
74. Prendergast, supra note 66, at 2.
75. Outside of such events, art dealers are often responsible for finding and matching buyers and
sellers, but some only sell to a small group of wealthy clients they have long-term relationships
with. Olav Velthuis, Art Dealers, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 28, 38-39 (Ruth
Towse ed., 2d ed. 2011).
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typically take three to six months between consignment and sale,76 so it can be
quite difficult to sell artworks quicldy even if a market exists.
Art also poses special valuation problems, further hampering liquidity. Since
demand for a particular piece is largely dependent on the aesthetic or intellectual
appreciation that a small cohort of wealthy collectors has for it,7 7 it can be diffi-
cult to accurately value any particular piece, and the ability to find a buyer willing
to pay a particular valuation can vary substantially over time depending on idi-
osyncratic and subjective factors. Since liquidity involves the ability to quicldy
find a buyer at a given price, these valuation challenges can also undermine li-
quidity. Moreover, the factors that cause an artwork's value to appreciate often
operate on a long time horizon. Artworks gain value when artists become more
established and develop a more prominent reputation.78 However, recognition
of artistic movements and the canonization of artists can take a significant
amount of time.
Finally, investing in art entails significant maintenance and transaction
costs.7 9 Buying and selling artworks can be expensive. Auction houses generally
charge buyers 10-25% of the sales price, and sellers up to io% of the sales price.o
76. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 170.
77. See Sharon V. Thach & Kimball P. Marshall, An Illustration of Opaque Markets: High End Fine
Art 5-6 (2016), http://ssm.com/abstract=2733153 [http://perma.cc/9E9V-9EUR] (describ-
ing how the valuation of art is "inherently subjective and intangible" with "no practical usage,"
such that the value "depends on the opinions and tastes of others with respect to the artist
generally and the artwork," in particular "art historians, art valuation specialists, museum cu-
rators, and professional critics in influential publications"); see also Sommer, supra note 1 ("Art
is unique as an investment in that there are many non-monetary investment reasons behind
collecting. Surveys have shown on average only io percent of HNWIs own fine art and paint-
ings purely as a financial investment, though other surveys suggest a much higher percent-
age.").
78. Jens Beckert & Jdrg Rdssel, The Price of Art: Uncertainty and Reputation in the Art Field, 15 J.
EUR. Soc'Ys 178 (2013) ("[T]he artistic status of an art work or artist - the 'quality' - evolves
from an intersubjective process of experts, institutions, and media in the art field assessing
work and conferring reputation . . . . [R]eputation is perceived as a quality signal by buyers
and is therefore the basis for determining the economic value of art works."); Susanne Schdn-
feld & Andreas Reinstaller, The Effects of Gallery and Artist Reputation on Prices in the Primary
Market for Art: A Note 1 (WU Vienna Univ. of Econ. & Bus., Dep't of Econ. Working Paper
No. 90, May 2005), http://epub.wu.ac.at/342 [http://perma.cc/DUL3-P9JQ]-
79. See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 72, at 270 ("One source of illiquidity is exogenous transac-
tion costs, such as brokerage fees, order-processing costs, or transaction costs.")(emphasis
omitted).
so. Usually auction houses charge the highest fees for the lowest price artworks. For example, an
auction house might charge 25% on the first $20,000, 20% on the amount above $20,000 and
up to $5oo,ooo, and 12% on the amount above $500,ooo. MICHAEL FINDLAY, THE VALUE OF
ART 76 (2012); see also Tara Loader-Wilkinson, How Art Expenses Stack Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
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The costs of maintaining and insuring the piece can cost an additional 1-5% of
the value of the piece each year." As a result, art collectors must often wait sev-
eral years before the price of the piece increases sufficiently to offset the costs of
buying, maintaining, insuring, and selling it.8 2 Moreover, the high costs associ-
ated with collecting art are not offset by any revenue produced by the artworks
before they are sold. Unlike companies that provide dividends to investors or
real estate that yields rental payments, art generates no periodic payments for
investors. Thus, their investment is essentially completely illiquid for several
years, during which time they must expend significant sums to insure and store
the pieces.
The illiquidity of art as an asset makes it difficult for art investment vehicles
to offer more liquid investment opportunities to investors. Investment funds
typically provide greater liquidity to investors in the form of redemption rights,"
the ability for investors to return their shares to the fund in exchange for the cash
value of their shares before the termination of the fund.8 4 Indeed, in recent years,
some art funds have begun offering limited redemption rights, allowing inves-
tors to withdraw up to 5-io% of their investment in the fund each year." There
are significant challenges, however, to providing redemption rights in the con-
text of art funds. In fact, doing so can backfire and undermine the stability and
performance of the fund. As explained earlier, artworks often take several years
20, 2oio), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424o52748703959704575453162597091330
[http://perma.cc/UG2A-NZQ7] ("At Christie's or Sotheby's in New York you can expect o
pay an extra 25% on the value of purchases up to $50,ooo. Between $50,000 and $1 million,
a 20% fee is charged, and there is a 12% charge on the portion of the price over $1 million.");
Sommer, supra note 1 ("Auction fees for the buyer can exceed io to 20 percent of the hammer
price. Other ongoing expenses such as storage, insurance, advisory and appraisal costs may
also eat into returns.").
81. See Loader-Wilkinson, supra note So.
82. See supra note 6o and accompanying text.
83. Specifically, hedge funds and mutual funds generally provide investors with redemption
rights. Morley, supra note 23, at 1235, 1246.
84. Id. at 1235.
8. " [S]ince the market crash of 2008, investors have been wary of tying up their money for sev-
eral years with no get out clause. 'Art funds by their very nature are illiquid ... so now we're
seeing more hybrids that resemble a private equity fund in that people aren't really supposed
to be able to come in or out and fees are charged on actual capital raised and profits realised -
but at the same time you do allow some limited liquidity; you allow some people to withdraw;
maybe 5-io% of the fund in any given year. This helps market the fund to investors: they feel
that they are not completely trapped."' Jenny White, Art Funds: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, PRIV. ART INVESTOR (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.privateartinvestor.com/art-finance/art
-funds-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly [http://perma.cc/5XTP-38K3].
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to sufficiently appreciate to offset transaction and maintenance costs.8 6 That
timescale means that funds that are forced to sell works early in their lifecycles
are likely to see losses. This is particularly true of works from the secondary mar-
ket that are bought at the full retail price." Considering the existing challenge
of investor confidence given the limited financial success of past art investment
vehicles, losses on initial sales can further undermine investor confidence and
potentially lead to a run on the fund, where investors panic and rush to redeem
their shares, forcing the fund to prematurely sell its assets and become insol-
vent." As a result, the illiquidity of artworks makes it difficult for art investment
vehicles to increase the liquidity of their offerings.
Of course, the illiquidity of their offerings does not necessarily doom art in-
vestment vehicles. Private equity firms specialize in making illiquid offerings"
and have created a large market for such investment opportunities. As of Decem-
ber 2016, private equity firms had nearly $2.5 trillion in assets under manage-
ment.90 John Morley has argued that private equity firms compensate investors
for their lack of exit rights91 by giving them greater contractual protections.92
86. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
87. As discussed in Section I.B, works on the primary market are often sold at a discount due to
the stigma that accompanies a decline in price.
88. A run on the fund occurs when investors lose confidence in a fund and seek to redeem their
investments in excess of what the fund has in liquid reserves. Like bank runs, which can hap-
pen even to solvent banks, a run on the fund could destroy even potentially profitable funds.
See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91
J. PoL. ECON. 401, 401-03 (1983) (describing the mechanics of a bank run, where "depositors
rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail. . . . [T]he sudden with-
drawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss and to fail. . . . Illiquidity of
assets provides the rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to
runs"). Since a key feature of funds is limited liquidity, forcing funds to liquidate their assets
prematurely can lead to losses, such that they are unable to pay back all of the investors seeking
to exercise their redemption rights. If investors see that many other investors are exercising
their redemption rights, they might seek to do so as well out of fear that the fund will not be
able to return their investment if they wait too long. This creates a positive feedback cycle,
such that even investors who originally had confidence in the fund will rationally seek to with-
draw their investment.
89. Private equity funds generally do not give investors redemption rights and instead require
investors to lock their capital into the fund for the duration of the fund's life, making these
offerings very illiquid. Morley, supra note 23, at 1236.
go. Arleen Jacobius, Private Equity Assets Rise 4% in 2016 -Report, PENSION & INV. (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://www.pionline.com/article/2o170308/ONLINE/1703o9842/private-equity-assets-rise
-4-in-2016-8212-report [http://perma.cc/LHN7-TJA5].
91. Exit rights provide investors with liquidity by allowing them to take their money out of the
fund before the end of the fund's life.
92. Morley, supra note 23, at 1255.
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Private equity firms increase contractual protections for investors by providing
for an investor-elected advisory board along with strong performance incentives
for fund managers." The contractual protections include mechanisms to address
conflicts of interest and to ensure that the fund managers devote a requisite
amount of time and resources to each fund.94
These contractual protections might be sufficient in more established mar-
kets, such as the leveraged buyout or venture capital markets, where investors
have seen firms produce significant returns in excess of the market.9' However,
they do not appear to be sufficient in the still-developing art-fund market, where
the returns have not been as well documented or as strong.96 A firm's track record
is one of the most important factors investors consider when evaluating invest-
ment opportunities, but most art funds are only a couple years old,98 and few
have successfully exited any prior funds.99 As a result, new capital flowing into
the art-fund market has largely gone to existing art funds with some track record
rather than new ones. In fact, the Fine Art Group accounted for more than $350
million of the $557-9 million total amount of assets under management in the
93. Id. at 1255, 1257.
94. Id. at 1255.
95. Tim Jenkinson et al., How Do Private Equity Investments Perform Compared to Public Equity?, 14
J. INV. MGMT. 2 (2016).
96. See supra note 41.
97. ERIK SERRANO BERNTSEN & JOHN THOMPSON, A GUIDE TO STARTING YOUR HEDGE FUND 120
(2015) ("The perceived experience of a fund manager is one of the most important factors for
investors when determining a fund's attractiveness, and therefore defines the ease with which
a fund will be able to raise and maintain capital."); Steve Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private
Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows, 6o J. FINANCE 1791, 1821 (2005)
(" [P] erformance increases ... with fund size and with the GP's experience.... [A] GP's track
record is positively related to the GP's ability to attract capital into new funds."); Stuart Taylor,
How Investors Can Utilize Performance Track Records To Make Investment Decisions, 17 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 24, 24 (2014) (" [A]nalyzing past performance track records should play an integral
role in an investment professional's due diligence.... [P]erformance data . .. confirms the
importance of this observation, with significant correlation demonstrated between predeces-
sor and successor fund returns . . . ."); Radell, supra note 37 ("Among private investment fund
insiders, especially on the institutional level, showing a track record of delivering superior
returns to investors goes a long way toward attracting new capital. Track record is far more
important than ingenious investment philosophies and strategies which, until proven, remain
hypothetical:").
gs. Shaw, supra note 39 (quoting Philip Hoffiman that " [m]ost art funds lack staying power and
long-term capital,' and noting that the majority of art funds are less than two years old).
99. The financial crisis led most then-extant art funds to shut down. See ZORLONI, supra note 27,
at 153.
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U.S. and European art-fund markets in 2016.100 The art-fund market's lack of a
significant track record has consequently made it difficult for art funds to attract
investors with their illiquid offerings.
Thus, the illiquidity of art as an asset class has made it difficult for art invest-
ment vehicles to increase the liquidity of their offerings and attract more inves-
tors. Although art funds have made it easier to invest in a diversified portfolio of
art, investors in art funds must still keep their money locked in the fund for al-
most a decade before seeing a return. In addition, art exchanges, which in theory
would provide investors with more liquidity through resale rights, have faced
regulatory barriers to their creation. As a result, the art investment vehicles that
exist in the United States' today are highly illiquid, limiting their attractiveness
to investors. Moreover, given that liquidity is a particular concern for less afflu-
ent investors,0 1 the illiquidity of art investment vehicles further limits the acces-
sibility of such vehicles. Illiquidity has thus presented a fundamental barrier,
limiting the ability for art investment vehicles to present compelling investment
offerings to investors.
B. Misalignment of Incentives Between Art Investment Vehicles and the Primary
Market
The challenge art investment vehicles face in accessing quality works on the
primary market limits both their potential returns and their ability to expand
access to the art market. There are many potential financial benefits for art in-
vestment vehicles operating on the primary market- the works are often sold at
a discount and are more likely to appreciate on a shorter time horizon.102 More-
over, given the exclusivity of the primary market, having art investment vehicles
take part in this market would expand access to the primary market to a much
broader array of investors. This Section will discuss the barriers that art invest-
ment vehicles face to becoming players on the primary market.
Within the art market, there is a tension between maximizing the present
sale price of a piece of art and cultivating longer-term market confidence in the
value of the artist and her body of work. This tension is evident in the very dif-
ferent practices of the primary and secondary markets. On the primary market,
where artworks are sold for the first time, galleries take an active role in increas-
ing the long-term value of their artists' oeuvres. In support of this goal, galleries
usually provide financial support to artists, actively promote the artists' pieces,
ioo. Shaw, supra note 39.
101. See supra note 21.
102. See supra notes 63-64; see also infra note io6.
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and manage the sales of their work.0 3 Works on the primary market are not
necessarily sold to the highest bidder. Ideally, artists and galleries try to place
their pieces with esteemed museums or reputable collectors, but at a minimum
they strive to place pieces with collectors who they think are unlikely to resell the
pieces in the near future or who would be willing to resell the pieces back to the
gallery rather than to collectors on the secondary market.104
While this may seem inefficient, actors on the primary market do this to
manage the supply and prices of an artist's pieces over time by retaining a mo-
nopolist position.0 5 Artists and galleries are invested not only in the value of a
given piece at a given point in time but in the artist's entire oeuvre over the long
term. A boom-and-bust cycle in one of an artist's pieces could damage the value
of all of the artist's present and future works. Thus, galleries often intentionally
set the initial sale price for a piece below the market price in order to allow it to
appreciate gradually over time, rather than risk the possibility that the piece will
reach its maximum price too early and then depreciate.106 Galleries have even
been known to buy back their own artists' pieces or bid on them at auctions to
protect them from significant declines in price."o0 The incentive of primary mar-
ket players is thus to maximize the long-term value of the artworks, in part
through preventing price declines that could create strong negative signals to
collectors, even if doing so involves selling artworks below the market price.
The secondary market, in contrast, generally strives to sell pieces for the
highest price possible, regardless of the potential effects on an artist's oeuvre.
103. MAGNUS RESCH, MANAGEMENT OF ART GALLERIES 109 (2016).
104. See VELTHUIS, supra note 62, at 7, 90-91 (2005); see also supra note 66; infra note 117.
105. VELTHUIS, supra note 62, at 79-83.
io6. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 176. There is significant stigma around price declines. In a
survey of gallerists, one author received responses like "a work of art is never decreased in
price, never," "the problem is that if your prices are very high, you cannot go back anymore,"
and "I have a moral responsibility to maintain the price." Olav Velthuis, Symbolic Meaning of
Prices: Constructing the Value of ContemporaryArt in Amsterdam and New York Galleries, 32 THE-
ORY & SOC'Y 181, 191 (2003); see also JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS
OF ART AND CULTURE 170 (2001) ("For new artists who have yet to establish themselves, a
dealer may keep prices low in the first show. A sellout encourages slightly higher prices for a
subsequent show."); Allison Schrager, High-End Art Is One of the Most Manipulated Markets in
the World, QUARTZ (July 11, 2013), http://qz.com/1o3o91/high-end-art-is-one-of-the-most
-manipulated-markets-in-the-world [http://perma.cc/4MSX-ZSJA] ("Galleries may drop an
artist rather than lower the price of their work because doing so sends a bad signal about the
value of the artist and the credibility of the gallery."); Velthuis, supra, at 196 ("The dramatic
consequences of price decreases on the collector's appraisal generate an incentive for art deal-
ers to start low and increase prices only cautiously.").
107. Schrager, supra note io6 ("It is not uncommon for gallery owners to bid on their artists[']
work at the auction in order to control the market price.").
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Unlike the primary market, connections and reputation are not prerequisites for
bidding at auctions in the secondary market. Instead, auctions are usually open
to the public, and pieces go to the highest bidder. Moreover, instead of artificially
low prices, the secondary market can suffer from artificially high prices as a result
of the winner's curse.08 The idea behind the winner's curse is that the winner of
a common value auction'09 with incomplete information is likely to overpay. 110
When there is an objective valuation for how much an artwork is worth but un-
certainty about this valuation, the person who bid the highest amount, i.e. won
the auction, is likely to have overestimated the value of the work. This phenom-
enon is not a general condemnation of the art auction market given that art auc-
tions are arguably not common value auctions - the bidders have very different
subjective valuations for the artwork."' If a collector would enjoy the artwork
far more than any of the other bidders, the collector has arguably not overpaid
for the artwork by bidding more than anyone else. The issue, however, is that
art investment vehicles are not buying artworks for their consumption value but
rather for their resale value, so for the art investment vehicle, the auction is more
akin to a common value auction.112 Thus, if an art investment vehicle wins an
auction, i.e. bids more for the artwork than anyone else is willing to pay, the art
investment vehicle is likely to have made a poor bet. Indeed, some studies have
found evidence for a winner's curse in the art market." As a result, there is often
io8. See infra note 113.
iog. Common-value auctions are "auctions where the value of the item is the same to everyone but
different bidders have different estimates about the underlying value'" John H. Kagel &
Dan Levin, Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse: Lessons from the Economics Labora-
tory 1 (2001), http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/CVsurvey.short.PDF [http://perma.cc
/3UFS-AMBT].
110. John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auc-
tions, 76 AMERicANECON. REV. 894 (1986).
iii. William N. Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel, Private Value Components, and the Winner's Curse
in an Art Index, 39 EURo. ECON. REV. 549, 550 (1995).
112. The common value in this case is the resale value. Everyone in the auction is trying to guess
what the resale value of the work will be, and since this is a question of prediction, there is a
single correct answer (unlike the case where people are bidding in part based on their personal
enjoyment of the work, such that there is not a single true value of the artwork).
113. See, e.g., Roman Krdiussl & Elizaveta Mirgorodskaya, The Winner's Curse on Art Markets (Ctr.
for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 564,2016); Goetzmann & Spiegel, supra note iII, at 549.
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a significant gap between the prices of pieces on the primary market and on the
secondary market, with the latter exceeding the former.114
In order to prevent arbitrage between the primary and secondary markets,
galleries are selective about their clientele. Collectors who develop a reputation
for "flipping" pieces, or buying them only to quickly resell them on the second-
ary market for a higher price, may be barred from buying pieces on the primary
market." This creates a misalignment between the goals of primary market
players and art investment vehicles. Primary art market players, such as galleries,
aim to restrict how and when pieces are sold. While art investment vehicles
would like to sell works at peak prices, galleries and dealers strive to prevent
artworks from being sold at inflated prices on the secondary market out of fear
that the prices will subsequently decline or the works will fail to sell in the fu-
ture.116 Thus, from the perspective of galleries, there is little incentive to sell their
best works to art investment vehicles since they do not provide the reputational
benefits of a placement with a prestigious collector and might sell a work prem-
aturely. In fact, the ability of collectors to gain access to top galleries and artists
often depends on collectors' assurances to galleries that they will not resell works
prematurely or on the secondary market.1
114. For example, in December 1999, Andreas Gursky's photographs sold out on the primary mar-
ket (a commercial New York gallery) for $50,ooo per item. Two weeks earlier, a 1995 photo-
graph of his was purchased on the secondary market (Christie's New York) for $173,000.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 175.
115. See id. at 176; New or Secondhand?: The Ins and Outs of Primary and Secondary Markets, ECON-
OMIST (2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14941173 [http://perma.cc/FD27-Z55W]
("Collectors who 'flip' work at auction may have their privileges [to buy pieces from select
artists] withdrawn or find themselves excluded from the gallerist's coterie."). Many important
galleries have blacklisted prominent art speculator Stefan Simchowitz. Christopher Glazek,
The Art World's Patron Satan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o1
/o4/magazine/the-art-worlds-patron-satan.html [http://perma.cc/SS9E-UQSX]. Another
article reported on a young art collector who bought a work and was offered fifty times the
purchase price a few weeks later. The collector refused, however, since "reselling it at a profit
without the gallery's permission would blackball her from the art industry. To her, that was
not worth the millions she was offered." Schrager, supra note io6.
116. She Can't Be Bought, N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/art/11265/index.html
[http://perma.cc/U23F-LHCC] ("Galleries often make clients promise not to resell work at
auction, arguing that it can put an artist's career (and the gallery's investment in that career)
at risk if the piece fails to sell. Conversely if it sells for too much, other collectors may be
inspired to dump work by the same artist at auction with similarly unpredictable results.").
117. Schrager, supra note io6 ("Galleries [] want to know the buyer in order to keep track of the
work. That way they can ensure it's available for exhibitions in the future and that it won't be
sold on the secondary auction market. Control over the market is so important to galleries
that they won't sell to collectors who will flip the art in the secondary market."); She Can't Be
Bought, supra note 116 (describing how galleries and dealers carefully decide who to "place"
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From the art investment vehicle's perspective, these mechanisms also make
operating on the primary market less attractive. The primary market's re-
strictions on when and to whom collectors can sell their works create a tension
between access to the primary market and maximizing liquidity. In order to give
galleries assurances that they will not sell pieces either when the price of the piece
goes down or is excessively inflated and that they will not sell pieces to undesir-
able speculators, art investment vehicles would significantly constrain the con-
ditions under which they could liquidate their holdings and also limit the posi-
tive financial returns they could derive.
Thus, in order for art investment vehicles to leverage the benefits of the pri-
mary art market and expand investor access to this market, the incentives for
cooperation between galleries and art funds will have to change. Section II.B will
discuss proposals to better align the incentives between art investment vehicles
and primary market players through contractual arrangements that give galleries
greater control over when pieces are sold and allow them to profit from such
sales without overly constraining the liquidity of art investment vehicles.
C. Securities Regulation Constraints
Finally, certain securities regulations hamper the successful operation of art
exchanges in the United States. The key differences between art funds and art
exchanges are that art exchanges have low or no barriers to entry for investors
and enable investors to easily resell their shares to other investors. Because of
these distinctions, art exchanges are able to offer investors much more liquid and
accessible investment opportunities than art funds.
The key reason that art funds do not provide these seemingly attractive fea-
tures is that, like other private equity and hedge funds, they use the security ex-
emption under Rule 506 of Regulation D1 " to avoid registering their offerings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Registering a securities
offering with the SEC is an expensive process that requires extensive and ongo-
ing disclosures to the Agency.1 9 In order to avoid having to register their offer-
ings, issuers must comply with restrictions depending on the type of exemption
works with as a way of "controlling what happens to art after they've parted with it - hence,
of manipulating its value," how "dealers really don't want to see ... a work get flipped at
auction,' and how " [d]ealers prefer that owners come back to them with works to resell, pri-
vately").
1S. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017).
ig. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that in addition to underwriting fees of 5-7% of
gross proceeds, companies on average incur $3.7 million in costs directly attributable to their
IPO and over $1 million in one-time costs as a result of going public. Considering an IPO? The
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they use. Rule 506 limits the ability of unaccredited investors20 to invest and
restricts the resale rights that can be given to investors - that is, the ability of
investors to sell their shares to other investors.12 1 Under Rule 5o6, investors
must be given restricted securities, which can only be resold under specific con-
ditions. In order to sell restricted securities without having to register the offer-
ing, investors must comply with Rule 144,122 which requires them to hold the
Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You, PWC 4 (2012), http://www.strategyand.pwc
.com/media/file/StrategyandConsidering-an-IPO.pdf [http://perma.cc/TPSN-WCWF].
The study also found that companies on average incur $1.5 million in recurring costs as a
result of being public. Id. A government task force estimated the costs of going public at $2.5
million on average and the costs of staying public at $1.5 on average annually. IPO Task Force,
Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and theJob Market Back on the Road
to Growth, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 9 (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/info
/smallbus/acsec/rebuildingthe ipo-on-ramp.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Y5G-UDM2]. In ad-
dition to the direct costs of the registration process, the process is also very time intensive,
taking around 75% of the CFO's time, 40% of the CEO's time, and 20% of the time of other
senior officers. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 152 (7 th
ed. 2013).
120. For the definition of an accredited investor, see supra note 70.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Under Rule 5o6(b), a "company may sell its securities to an unlimited
number of 'accredited investors' and up to 35 other purchasers." Rule 5o6 ofRegulation D, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers
-rule5o6htm.html [http://perma.cc/N7FG-GDAA]. These other purchasers must still be
"sophisticated,' however. Id. In addition, a company accepting unaccredited investors cannot
conduct general solicitations, and must provide any unaccredited investors with the disclosure
documents that usually accompany registered offerings and any other documents it gives to
accredited investors. Id. It also must be available to answer questions by prospective buyers.
Under Rule So6(c), the fund can broadly solicit and generally advertise the offering but must
limit itself to accredited investors and take reasonable steps to verify each investor's status. Id.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2017). Investors in art investment vehicles would generally be considered
non-affiliates to a nonreporting company. Affiliates are people who directly or indirectly con-
trol the entity in question. Id. § 230.405. For example, they include executive officers, direc-
tors, and large shareholders of the entity issuing the security. Rule 144: Selling Restricted and
Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter Rule 144] (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsrulel44htm.html
[http://perma.cc/ASN5-NNBU]. The investors in art investment vehicles with which this
Comment is concerned are those who are passively contributing money to the art investment
vehicle rather than owning/controlling it. Reporting companies are companies that are sub-
ject to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, which would happen if the company is listed
on a public stock exchange, if it has total assets greater than $1o million and a class of equity
securities held by 2,000 or more people or 5oo or more non-accredited investors, or if it has
issued public equity. COX ET AL, supra note 119, at io. The art investment vehicles discussed in
this piece only conduct private offerings and are generally not large enough to trigger these
reporting requirements. Another safe harbor that allows investors to sell their restricted shares
without registering the sale with the SEC is Rule 144A. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2017). This
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securities for at least one year.123 The investor must also gain the consent of the
fund to sell the security and have an intermediary called a transfer agent24 re-
move the restrictive legend (a statement on the security stating that it is a re-
stricted security) on the security.125
Given these restrictions on who can invest in private funds and the ability of
private fund investors to sell their shares, the art exchange model in the United
States has required the entities to be public. 126 The advantage of making an in-
vestment vehicle public is that the securities are traded on the public market,
meaning that anyone can invest and investors can easily resell their shares to
other investors.12 7 However, as discussed above, going public entails high initial
and ongoing regulatory compliance costs.128 Given the relatively small size of the
art investment vehicle market and limited financial success to date, raising suffi-
cient capital to make creating a public investment offering a viable option would
be challenging.
However, recent securities regulation reforms offer the potential to facilitate
the creation of art exchanges. Section II.C discusses two options created by these
changes through which art investment vehicles could achieve the benefits of low
barriers to entry and robust resale rights for investors while avoiding the large
costs associated with public offerings.
exemption, however, only applies to sales to qualified institutional investors, which are de-
fined as large institutional investors with at least $1oo million in assets. Id. at §230.144A
(a) (1) (i). Given the very limited involvement of large institutional investors in the art invest-
ment vehicle market, however, this exemption is not likely applicable.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.14 4 (d)(1)(ii).
124. A transfer agent is defined as "any person who engages on behalf of an issuer of securi-
ties . . . in (A) countersigning such securities upon issuance; (B) monitoring the issuance of
such securities with a view to preventing unauthorized issuance . . . (C) registering the trans-
fer of such securities; (D) exchanging or converting such securities; or (E) transferring record
ownership of securities by bookkeeping entry. . . ." 15 U.S.C § 78c(a)(25) (2012).
125. Rule 144, supra note 122. This process can add delays to the transfer and often requires the
investor to obtain a legal opinion stating that registration is not required. COX ET AL., supra
note 119, at 374.
126. Liquid Rarity Exchange, the primary example of an art exchange attempted in the United
States, planned to serve as a platform for "publicly traded shares of securitized art." Curley,
supra note 28.
127. "In a registered offering, issuers can offer the securities directly to all potential investors, with-
out a limitation on the aggregate offering amount and with no resale restrictions' "Amendments
for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), SEC. & Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION 244, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf [http://perma
.cc/V5VM-BZFM].
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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II. UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF ART INVESTMENT VEHICLES
This Part details three proposals that could address the challenges described
above. First, to increase liquidity and potential returns, art investment vehicles
should strive to create a robust art rental market that will allow them to profit
not only from the resale value of artworks but also their aesthetic value. Creating
a vibrant rental market would transform art from a cash-flow-negative asset to a
cash-flow-positive asset. Instead of causing investors losses throughout the in-
vestment period due to storage and insurance costs, the artworks would actually
generate profits, increasing the amount of liquid cash available to art investment
vehicles to distribute to investors in the form of dividends or redemption rights.
Second, well-designed contractual arrangements could open the primary art
market to art investment vehicles: by creating arrangements that allow galleries
to retain equity in the pieces they sell to art investment vehicles and that limit
how and when art investment vehicles can resell pieces, galleries would be in-
centivized to provide high-quality works to art investment vehicles, as they
would both incur lower transaction costs than if they were to evaluate individual
collectors and profit when the works are resold for higher prices. These re-
strictions on the conditions of resale would allay galleries' and artists' concerns
that art investment vehicles would engage in arbitrage without unduly restrict-
ing the investment vehicle's ability to resell the piece of artwork when desired.
Allowing galleries to retain equity in works they sell to art investment vehicles
would also align the interests of galleries and art investment vehicles by incen-
tivizing galleries to provide their top works to art investment vehicles. Expand-
ing the access of art investment vehicles to the primary market would not only
potentially improve the returns of art investment vehicles but also give access to
this exclusive segment of the art market to less-established investors.
Third, art exchanges can leverage recent regulatory developments in the
United States. The securities registration exemptions created by Regulation
Crowdfundingl29 and Regulation A+1s0 provide a way for art exchanges to form
without facing the prohibitively high costs of making public offerings. By char-
acterizing art management companies as startups, art management compames
could sell equity on an art exchange that would essentially function as a crowd-
funding platform. The new regulations would allow these platforms to sell
shares with resale rights to a much broader array of investors.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263 (2017).
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A. Creating a Robust Art Rental Market
One of the key features of art investment vehicles is that they separate the
aesthetic value of a piece of artwork from its investment value. Whereas art col-
lection typically bundles the ability to possess and enjoy the piece with the ability
to sell and profit from it, art investment vehicles give investors access to the in-
vestment value of a piece without necessarily giving them access to the physical
piece itself. Although some art funds provide opportunities for their investors to
rent pieces from the fund, artworks owned by art funds are primarily kept in
storage."' Moreover, while some companies have created an art rental market
for lower-end art,132 as of yet there is no large, public marketplace for high-end
art rental.
By renting out their artworks, art investment vehicles could increase the li-
quidity and potential returns of their offerings. By generating income from rent-
als, art investment vehicles would not need to hold artworks for as long of a time
in order to have the artwork's appreciation offset the maintenance and transac-
tion costs - the revenue would at least partially offset these costs. In addition, art
rental would increase the data available regarding the potential financial value of
the artworks, making them less risky investments and expanding the pool of po-
tential investors. Since liquidity reflects the ability to quickly find a buyer who is
willing to pay a given price for the asset, making the prices for artworks more
tethered to objective considerations - the net present value of art rental pay-
ments instead of one's personal subjective appreciation for the artwork- would
enhance the liquidity of the artworks.
Moreover, in the absence of a robust rental market, the artwork's aesthetic
value is wasted: no one gets to enjoy the artwork. Indeed, one of the negative
consequences of the rising interest in art investing is the growing use of art stor-
age.' Art rental would not only turn these assets from being cash flow negative
131. See supra note 25.
132. See, e.g., RISE ART, http://www.riseart.com [http://perma.cc/U4GW-F4AR]; TURNING ART
http://www.tumingart.com [http://perma.cc/VW3B-4DK9]. The works on these platforms
are primarily for decorative rather than investment purposes.
133. See Foulkes, supra note 25; Cynthia O'Murchu, Art: A Market Laid Bare, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a91al6o8-d887-nie4-8a23-ool44feab7de.html
[http://perma.cc/39RM-RWMZ]; David Segal, Swiss FreeportsAre Homefora Growing Treas-
ury ofArt, N.Y. TIMEs (July 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o7/22/business/swiss
-freeports-are-home-for-a-growing-treasury-of-art.html [http://perma.cc/F3SQ-K9CL];
Sharon V. Thach & Kimball R. Marshall, An Illustration of Opaque Markets: High End Fine Art
7-8 (2016), http://ssm.com/abstract id=2733153 [http://perma.cc/3JS3-697H] (describing
how the trend of collecting art "not for display, but purely as a store of value" has led to the
expansion of the art storage industry). Even Christie's is making a long-term investment in
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to cash flow positive, but would also make it more affordable for people to enjoy
fine art in their homes or public venues. Robust rental markets would also ex-
pose a wider audience to the piece, which could increase the work's value if it is
well received.
To illustrate the potential value that can be created by leveraging both the
full aesthetic and investment values of artworks, let us posit a collector A and a
speculator B. A values the enjoyment she receives from hanging a piece in her
home for a decade at $10,000 and she does not intend to sell the piece.134 Spec-
ulator B does not value the aesthetics of the piece and would put it in storage
immediately, but believes that he will be able to sell the work for $1o,ooo in the
future. Let us also posit an investor C who values the aesthetic enjoyment of the
piece at $5,500 and projects that she will be able to resell it in a decade for $5,500,
making her total valuation of the piece $11,ooo. If only one investor can purchase
the piece, then, ignoring the time value of money, the piece will go to C for
$1o,oo. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the artist did not have costs
associated with the creation of the artwork, the artist would receive $1o,oo of
producer surplus, and C would receive $999 of utility in the form of consumer
surplus, for a total gain of $11,ooo. This outcome, however, is suboptimal from
the perspective of maximizing overall utility.
A scenario that would result in greater utility would be for A to buy the right
to possess the physical art piece for $5,501, and B to buy the resale rights to the
piece for $5,501. A would take the piece home and enjoy $1o,ooo of value, which
would result in $4,499 in consumer surplus. If B's predictions are accurate (that
the piece can be resold for $1o,ooo in ten years), when the piece is resold, B will
make a profit of $4,499. In this scenario, the artist would make more than in the
previous scenario ($11,002 rather than $1o,oo), and the total consumer surplus
is $8,998, so the total surplus value from this transaction is $20,000.' This is
the continued growth of the art storage market by expanding its storage offerings in London
and building a new facility at the Singapore Freeport. Marion Maneker, The Boom in Art Stor-
age: Christie's View, ART MKT. MONITOR (June 29,20o9), http://www.artmarketmonitor.com
/20o9/o6/29/the-boom-in-art-storage-christies-view [http://perma.cc/NR9R-CNGV].
134. Realistically, there are probably very few art buyers who would value the resale rights of an
art piece at $o. Nonetheless, one could conceive of collectors who do not intend to sell the
piece in their lifetime (and who derive zero utility from the possibility that their heirs might
sell the piece -perhaps they are not particularly fond of them), or even collectors who derive
so much negative utility from the process of selling a piece that on net they do not benefit
from the resale.
135. Note that, in a denser market, where the parties were forced to pay their willingness-to-pay,
the artist would be able to capture all of the value created by the more efficient allocation. For
example, suppose that there also is an art collector D who values the aesthetic returns of the
piece at $9,999 and an art speculator E who values the resale rights at $9,999. In this case, A
would buy the right to possess the physical piece for $1o,ooo, and B would buy the resale
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far more total utility than what was achieved when only one individual could
purchase the financial and aesthetic value of the piece (i.e., $11,ooo). As this ex-
ample demonstrates, through more efficiently allocating the aesthetic and invest-
ment values of the artwork, far more utility can be achieved.
Separating the aesthetic and investment values of a piece of artwork and al-
locating each to the highest value user is something that art investment vehicles
are uniquely designed to do. A core feature of art investment vehicles is that be-
cause there are many "owners" of the artworks, no owner has full possession over
the physical artwork. Although this is a negative feature of existing art invest-
ment vehicles - the artworks are generally kept in storage rather than enjoyed by
anyone -this feature could be leveraged to give art lovers greater access to art-
works in their homes. By creating a robust art rental market, art investment ve-
hicles could increase the total value extracted from the art market and also en-
hance their own profitability. Instead of having artworks sit in storage, only to
be liquidated after several years, renting out the artworks would give the art in-
vestment vehicle greater access to capital and shift some of the costs of maintain-
ing the artworks to the renters.
Art rental could also lead to more transparent and reliable pricing of art-
works. Artworks can be rented far more frequently than they can be sold. The
amount that individuals are willing to pay to rent them would provide more data
about market demand, making it easier to accurately estimate the net present
value of an artwork. Given how little data is available about prices on the art
market, such data could be quite valuable.13 6 Art price indices often rely on track-
ing price changes in individual works that have been sold at auction more than
once."' This method is not very reliable, however, given how infrequently works
go up for auction.' In contrast, one method for valuing real estate, another rel-
atively illiquid asset that is sold infrequently, is the income method, which esti-
mates the value of a piece of real estate as the net present value of future rental
rights for $1o,ooo. The artist in this scenario would receive $20,000 for the piece, far exceed-
ing the $11,ooo she would receive if only one investor could buy the piece.
136. Existing art databases charge steep fees for searches and generally only feature auction sales
data. Since auctions account for at most half of the market (primary market sales do not occur
through auctions), the amount of information available for any given piece or subset of pieces
is very limited. GERLIS, supra note 57, at 32 (describing how artnet has the one of the most
comprehensive databases of art sales prices available and charges $976 for 450 individual sale
searches in 2013).
137. Radell, supra note 37 (describing the repeat sales regression approach used to construct the
Mei Moses All Art Index).
138. Id. (describing how "[t] he primary problem with applying repeat sales regression to art data
is the paucity of available information" and the issues of selection bias).
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payments, using past rental data to inform this estimate.3 9 The availability of
art rental data would thus allow a similar methodology to be used in the art
world 40 and would give potential buyers more data about how much the piece
is worth. More transparent and reliable pricing would in turn increase liquidity
in the market as buyers could have greater assurances regarding the value of the
piece, taking some of the subjectivity out of art pricing and making it easier for
sellers to quickly sell pieces at a stable price. Moreover, by providing more fre-
quent objective signals of the artwork's value, the rental data might help mitigate
the potential for rampant speculation, a problem that has plagued Chinese art
exchanges.141 instead of simply guessing at the potential resale value of an art-
work, investors would have more access to concrete data on how much money
people are willing to spend on the artwork.
Despite these advantages, renting out high-end art is risky. The process of
renting itself might lead to depreciation of the piece if renters do not properly
care for the piece or if the work is damaged in transit. Costs to insure the piece
would thus likely increase significantly. Moreover, artists have rights that could
be violated if works are damaged. Artists' moral rights include the right to pre-
vent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work. 142
In order to mitigate these issues, the art investment vehicle should therefore
carefully vet renters and place restrictions on where and how the artwork can be
displayed.
Despite these challenges, a rental market for high-end art has several bene-
fits: establishing a rental market for art owned by art investment vehicles would
increase efficiency in the art world by allocating the aesthetic and investment
139. Stephan Abraham, Rental Properties: 4 Ways to Value a Real Estate Property, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb.
8, 2017, 10:02 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mortgages-real-estate/11/how-to
-value-real-estate-rental.asp [http://perma.cc/7UAU-828P].
140. Noah Horowitz, a prominent art historian and expert, has made the point that it is common
in real estate and equity markets to estimate the value of an asset based on the discounted
value of its future cash flows, but this is far more difficult in the context of art, given that art
generally is a cash flow negative asset. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 170.
141. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
142. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § io6A(a) (3) (2012). Note that there are
some limitations on this "integrity right": the change in the work must be prejudicial to the
artist's reputation, the right is nontransferable, and the right only applies to works by living
artists. Id. § 603(a) (3), (e). Moreover, the protection only applies to "works of visual art" and
only encompasses limited edition works of 200 copies or fewer. Id. § ioi. The right of integrity
allows artists to sue for an injunction or damages. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Au-
thors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
95, 118 (1997). The Visual Artists Rights Act permits courts to assess statutory damages that
exceed actual injuries provable by the plaintiff. Id. at 124.
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values of artworks to the highest-value users and potentially lead to higher re-
turns for art investment vehicles. The cash flow from rentals would also put art
investment vehicles in a better position to offer investors more liquidity through
dividends and/or redemption rights. Moreover, art rental would also make ac-
cessing high-end artworks more accessible for those who are unable to buy entire
pieces. Thus, the natural separation of the aesthetic and investment values of
artworks that occurs with art investment vehicles could be leveraged to increase
the potential returns and liquidity of art investment vehicles and to increase the
accessibility of high-end art by creating a robust art rental market.
B. Gaining Access to the Primary Market
As discussed in Section I.B, the primary and secondary art markets are gov-
erned by different players and customs. 143 While the secondary market operates
on standard open market principles, the primary market attempts to distinguish
between collectors and speculators in order to exclude speculators. This need to
distinguish between types of buyers leads to substantial transaction costs for
both buyers and sellers. Buyers must invest in signaling to show that they are
reliable art collectors. For example, they must foster connections with galleries
and dealers and keep their acquisitions off the secondary market even if doing so
means reducing the liquidity of their holdings and forgoing higher sale prices.144
Unlike in most markets, art sellers cannot rely on willingness to pay as a proxy
for buyer suitability.145 This is particularly true as there may be a positive corre-
lation between the likelihood that a buyer is a speculator and that buyer's will-
ingness to pay: a buyer is likely to pay more if the buyer anticipates profiting
from the artwork in the short term. Thus, reputation and connections are nec-
essary factors in determining buyer suitability. 146
This selectiveness of clientele excludes not only less-established collectors
from the primary market but also art investment vehicles. In general, the quali-
ties in buyers that primary market players look for are distinct from those found
in art investment vehicles. Even if the managers of art investment vehicles have
good reputations and connections in the art world, the primary goal of art in-
vestment vehicles is to sell their artworks at he maximum price possible, within
the lifespan of the investment vehicle. This makes art investment vehicles akin
143. See supra Section I.B.
144. See supra note 104.
145. "Good galleries ... sell works they consider important only to people or institutions they con-
sider appropriate buyers. Very often at the expense of near-term cashflows." Gerber, supra note
63, at 7; New or Secondhand, supra note 115 ("In the primary market, the collector who offers
the most money is not necessarily the one who wins the work.").
146. VELTHUIS, supra note 62, at 90.
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to speculators and puts the interests of the investors in direct conflict with the
interests of the galleries and artists.
Both art investment vehicles and primary market players could benefit, how-
ever, from transacting with each other. As discussed above, art investment vehi-
cles stand to benefit financially from buying top works on the primary market
since these works are generally sold at a discount compared with works on the
secondary market and have the potential to appreciate more significantly on
shorter time horizons. As a result, investing on the primary market could give
art investment vehicles access to higher returns, and they would not have to hold
onto pieces as long to see a positive return. Moreover, since the primary market
is currently limited to art world insiders, operating on the primary market would
allow art investment vehicles to give a much broader array of investors access to
this market.
Galleries stand to benefit from selling to art investment vehicles in that doing
so would require lower transaction costs than vetting individual collectors - art
investment vehicles have much larger collections than most individual collectors
and are generally repeat players. Moreover, art investment vehicles are uniquely
situated to allow galleries to retain equity in their top works. Currently, when
galleries sell their works at a discount to collectors, they forgo some potential
income in the present in the hope that the piece will appreciate over time, the
artist's reputation will improve, and the future works of the artist will sell at
higher prices, increasing their long-term returns. If galleries could retain equity
in the pieces they sold, however, they could receive more direct financial benefits
from future appreciation in these works' prices. While individual collectors buy
pieces outright, art investment vehicles have the ability to divide ownership in
artworks among multiple parties. Having the gallery retain equity in the piece
would not only give the gallery access to this future profit stream, but would also
incentivize the gallery to provide art investment vehicles with top works that it
believes are likely to appreciate.
In order to create such mutually beneficial arrangements between primary
market players and art investment vehicles, however, it is important to resolve
the issue of when and how pieces sold to art investment vehicles can be resold.
In cases where there is sensitivity around future purchasers of an asset, rights of
first refusal are a common contractual provision. 147 In the context of companies,
147. Albert H. Choi, A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 252, 253
(2009) (" [T]he usage of right of first refusal is wide-spread: it is seen not only in lease agree-
ments, but also in joint venture agreements, sale and lease-back agreements, venture capital
financing, bylaws of small corporations and partnerships, oil and gas sale agreements, em-
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rights of first refusal require that the shareholders offer to sell their shares to
their fellow shareholders before selling the shares to third parties.14 The pur-
pose of such a provision is to protect existing shareholders' interests in being
able to determine who has ownership rights in the company. 149 Given that gal-
leries similarly want to control to whom their pieces are resold-for example,
they want to prevent their works from being sold to speculators - a right of first
refusal could potentially alleviate some of these concerns. Moreover, to the extent
that the gallery is willing to buy back the artwork, the gallery could retain control
of when the piece is sold by preventing untimely resales. In fact, rights of first
refusal are already used occasionally by galleries when working with individual
collectors. 10
One potential issue with a right of first refusal arrangement, however, is that
if the piece really is at the crest of a speculative bubble, the gallery might not have
sufficient capital to pay the market price. Most galleries have very limited work-
ing capital."' One possible way to address this issue would be to give the gallery
a right of first refusal where the gallery has the option to buy the piece back at
the initial sales price plus a negotiated interest rate if the price of the work in-
creases, or at the initial sales price if the price of the work decreases. The ad-
vantage of this arrangement for the gallery would be that if the artwork were in
a bubble and increased dramatically in price, exceeding the sales price plus inter-
est, the gallery could buy it back at a lower price. The advantage for the art in-
vestment vehicle would be that in the event the artwork actually declined in
price, such that the gallery would want to buy back the piece to avoid the nega-
tive price signal, the art investment vehicle would not lose any money. If the price
of the work increased but was not exhibiting unsustainable bubble-like prices,
the gallery would likely allow the sale to a third party. This arrangement would
ployment contracts, broadcasting agreements, and even contracts involving commercial prod-
ucts. A frequently offered justification is that the right minimizes the possibility of the right-
holder's having to face a new, undesirable partner in a relationship.").
148. See Walker, supra note 73, at 1.
149. Id. at 19 (describing how rights of first refusal are often used in contexts where insiders place
idiosyncratic value on the property and how, in the close corporation context, insiders might
value maintaining control).
150. See Amy J. Goldrich, Is a Right of First Refusal an Offer You Can't Refuse? If It's in Writing, Most
Probably, 2 SPENCER'S ART L.J. (2011), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/spencer
/spencers-art-law-joumal-9-2-11.asp [http://perma.cc/6TE5-SUBM]; Are Contemporary
Dealers Too Powerful?, FORBEs (July 5, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2oo5/o7/o5
/cx o705conn_1s.html [http://perma.cc/J3ZT-K2JA].
151. Despite the media stereotype of the art world being flush with cash, a third of galleries are
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be most beneficial if the gallery were more worried about the potential for spec-
ulative bubbles than the potential of price declines and if the art investment ve-
hicle were more worried about the possibility of losing money than the possibil-
ity of not maximizing their profits in the event their investment goes very well.
Under those circumstances, this arrangement would essentially help both parties
avoid their respective worst outcomes.
Another potential issue to address is that rights of first refusal have been
linked with lower asset prices.152 If an asset has a right of first refusal connected
to it, the seller can have a harder time getting competitive bids for the asset since
potential bidders know that there is a good chance they will not be able to buy
the asset-i.e., the right of first refusal will be exercised. To mitigate this issue,
the right of first refusal could be limited to an initial holding period, after which
the art investment vehicle would be free to sell the piece to third parties without
first offering it to the gallery. This would encourage the art investment vehicle
to hold onto the piece for at least the holding period but would also give the art
investment vehicle more flexibility to sell the work to third parties. By combining
the right of first refusal plus interest model discussed above with a minimum
holding period, the concerns that primary-market players have regarding the
potential for art investment vehicles to sell artworks at an unfavorable time or to
an unfavorable collector can be mitigated while not unduly restricting the liquid-
ity of art investment vehicles.
Of course, since this proposed arrangement is a compromise, the optimal
holding period and interest rate would depend on an array of factors, including
the forecasts of the art investment vehicle and the gallerist regarding the future
value of the piece, the other potential buyers in the market, and the costs associ-
ated with implementing more complex arrangements. This proposal, however,
gives both parties levers to pull to make the arrangement better conform to their
particular preferences and circumstances, assisting the parties to negotiate mu-
tually beneficial partnerships.
Thus, although the primary market's careful avoidance of speculative invest-
ment would suggest that art investment vehicles are ill suited for that market,
the ability of art investment vehicles to provide different rights to different par-
ties and to allow primary-market players to retain rights in artworks actually
creates significant potential for art investment vehicles to benefit primary-mar-
ket players and vice versa. Such partnerships could improve the potential invest-
ment returns of art investment vehicles by giving them access to the lucrative
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third-party bidders from entering a contest to purchase, and thus the instrument reduces a
seller's expected realization.").
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primary market while opening up investment in the highly exclusive primary
market to a broader array of investors.
C. Leveraging Recent Securities Law Reforms To Create Art Exchanges
While the previous proposals address the issues of liquidity and accessibility
in the art market indirectly by creating new liquid or lucrative revenue streams,
giving more people access to art in their homes, or making it easier to invest in
the exclusive primary market, art exchanges would directly increase the accessi-
bility and liquidity of art investment vehicles themselves. Unlike art funds, art
exchanges allow investors to easily sell their shares rather than have their capital
locked away for years. Moreover, art exchanges do not require a large capital
commitment, allowing less wealthy investors to participate in the art market.
Nonetheless, despite such benefits, almost all of the art investment vehicles in
the United States have been formed as art funds, not as art exchanges. Regula-
tory constraints on the creation of art exchanges have made them prohibitively
expensive due to two key characteristics of art exchanges: they are completely
open to unaccredited investors and they allow investors to buy and sell their
shares easily.
However, recent changes in the regulatory landscape have made these obsta-
cles less significant. Regulation Crowdfunding, "' an exemption from register-
ing with the SEC that was established by Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act, and Regulation A+,154 the amended version of Regulation
A, established by Title IV of the JOBS Act, have created new possibilities for art
exchanges in the United States.
Regulation Crowdfunding is an exemption that allows small companies to
raise funds from unaccredited investors through broker-dealers" or funding
platforms.15 6 Funding platforms are essentially intermediaries in the transac-
tions; they are websites or mobile apps where investors create accounts, review
153- 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017).
154. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (2017). Regulation A+ builds upon the previously existing Regula-
tion A. See COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 322.
155. Broker-dealers are individuals who are engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for themselves or others. COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 1020.
156. Unlike broker-dealers, funding platforms cannot offer investment advice or recommenda-
tions; solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities disclosed on its platform;
compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation; or hold, manage, or
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educational materials about crowdfunding, review information disclosed by the
companies seeking investment, and participate in forums about the investment
opportunities."' The exemption allows unaccredited investors to buy and sell
shares through funding platforms with comparatively minimal restrictions - a
cap on how much they can invest on such platforms each year and a holding
period of one year, during which shares can be sold to accredited investors, fam-
ily members, or back to the issuer.
Regulation A+ is another regulatory reform that opens the possibility of art
exchanges. The principal benefits of this exemption are higher fundraising caps,
the ability to engage in general solicitation (the ability to advertise the offering
to the general public), and minimal resale restrictions. The additional disclosure
and reporting requirements would make this exemption less attractive than Reg-
ulation Crowdfunding for nascent art companies but could be useful for larger,
more established ones who are seeking to raise larger sums of funding and are
less deterred by the costs of the additional requirements. Regulation A+ also
does not require transactions to occur through a broker-dealer or funding plat-
form. However, given that an important aspect of art exchanges is that they have
an intermediary facilitating the buying and selling of shares, the lack of this re-
quirement in Regulation A+ is not very significant - an art exchange would in-
volve some form of an intermediary platform regardless of whether the exemp-
tion required one.
Although these exemptions were designed to help startups raise funds from
small investors, they can be adapted to facilitate the creation of art exchanges.
Instead of crowdfunding platforms with traditional startups, art exchanges
would be funding platforms that host art management companies that buy,
manage, and sell artworks. These art management companies could be highly
specialized or diversified, providing investors with a variety of investment op-
portunties.
Although past art exchanges have usually focused on allowing investors to
buy shares in single artworks, the model proposed here would work even better
if the art management companies invested in a collection of artworks. It would
be more efficient for each art company to manage multiple artworks and spread
the costs of personnel across the pieces. Having investors invest in companies
with collections of artwork would also make it easier for less savvy investors to
diversify their portfolios. Furthermore, investing in collections rather than indi-
vidual pieces would make rampant speculation, which plagued Chinese art ex-
changes, less likely: unwarranted excitement over one artwork or artist would be
157. Updated Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(May 20, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib-crowdfunding-.html
[http://perma.cc/LSHN-L5RA].
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less likely to lead to excessive demand for the company's shares when that art-
work or artist is only a small part of the company's entire holdings.
Compared to art funds, the main downside of the art exchange model is that
investors would not be able to benefit from the economies of scope and scale of
investing in an art fund. Art funds have external management structures, mean-
ing that their management resides in an external entity, a firm that owns many
funds. External management structures allow for more efficient allocation of hu-
man capital and resources since all of the funds are able to share such resources.
Moreover, investors in art management companies, in contrast to art funds,
would be exposed not only to the risks inherent in the artworks themselves but
also in the risks associated with the quality of the company's management. Since
the managers and operational assets (e.g., computers and equipment) of art
funds are owned by a separate management company, the value of an art fund is
limited to the value of the investment assets, whereas the value of an art man-
agement company would include the value of the managers and operational as-
sets.1ss
Nonetheless, the gains of the art exchange model likely outweigh its down-
sides. For example, investors could have greater control over the art management
company through voting rights. Furthermore, the centralized system of having
many art companies listed on a single funding platform would also facilitate the
creation of a robust art rental market, as the funding platform could also act as a
repository for art rental options. The liquidity and accessibility that the art ex-
change model provides likely would outweigh efficiency concerns for many in-
vestors, particularly unaccredited investors who currently have little access to art
funds, and who would also especially value the ability to sell their shares.
Thus, recent regulatory reforms make the creation of art exchanges easier
and less costly. As will be discussed further in the following two sections, Regu-
lation Crowdfunding would be more appropriate for smaller art companies,
whereas Regulation A+ would be more beneficial for larger art companies. These
regulations create new opportunities for unaccredited investors to invest in pri-
vate companies and reduce the restrictions on their ability to sell their shares,
thus enabling two of the core features of art exchanges to be manifested in new
investment offerings.
158. See Morley, supra note 23, at 1258-59.
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1. Regulation Crowdfunding
Regulation Crowdfunding"9 allows companies to raise up to $1,070,000 a
year6 0 from investors through peer-to-peer funding platforms. Given how ex-
pensive art can be, this exemption would be most useful for small art companies
or art companies that have a steady revenue source - e.g., art rental - so that they
only need modest yearly funding infusions.
Like Regulation D -the exemption art funds rely on -investors are able to
resell their shares without restrictions after a one-year holding period. Unlike
Regulation D, however, within that year, investors can sell their shares without
registration to an accredited investor, the issuer of the securities, or a family
member, making these shares significantly more liquid than shares in art
funds. 161
In addition, unlike Regulation D, which caps the number of unaccredited
investors in the fund at thirty-five, there are no restrictions under Regulation
Crowdfunding on how many unaccredited investors would be able to invest in
these art investment vehicles. Instead of restricting the number of unaccredited
investors who can invest, Regulation Crowdfunding restricts how much each
unaccredited investor can invest in a given year. Investors whose net worth or
annual income are both less than $107,000 cannot invest more than $2,200, or
5% of the lesser of the investor's annual income or net worth.162 Investors with
over $107,000 in both net worth and annual income can invest up to io% of the
lesser of their net worth or annual income.16 3
The investor caps, though potentially restrictive, might actually be advanta-
geous in protecting unsophisticated investors and preventing rampant specula-
tion that could undermine the stability of nascent art exchanges. Given that pre-
dicting returns and risk from art investments is difficult, and that many small
investors might lack experience in evaluating art companies, allowing them to
invest up to 5% or io% of their income would provide these investors with the
benefits of diversifying their portfolios without exposing them to excessive risk.
Moreover, the holding-period requirement would further mitigate the risk of ex-
cessive speculation by maintaining some barriers to flipping shares.
Another prominent feature of Regulation Crowdfunding is that the buying
and selling of shares must be conducted through a funding platform or a broker-
159- 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017).
i6o. Id. § 227.1oo(a) (1).
161. Id. § 227-501.
162. Id. § 227.1oo(a) (2)(i).
163. Id. § 227.1oo(a) (2)(ii).
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dealer registered with the SEC. This requirement is designed to protect inves-
tors; the funding platform is charged with obtaining background information
from the company, making that information available to investors, and securing
investors' affirmations that they understand the risks of loss and illiquidity.164 In
particular, companies are required to provide general information about the
company, its officers and directors, a description of the business, the planned use
for the money raised from the offering, the target offering amount, the deadline
for the offering, related-party transactions, risks specific to the company, and
financial information, among other information.165 The level of financial disclo-
sure required depends on the amount of money the company is raising. Compa-
nies raising more than $100,000 must have their financial statements reviewed
by an independent public accountant, and companies raising more than
$500,000 must be audited by an independent public accountant if it is not the
company's first time crowdfunding.16 6
Notably, however, Regulation Crowdfunding exempts offerings from blue
sky registration requirements,167 a significant benefit given that one of the major
reasons funds and companies have sought to limit their offerings to accredited
investors has been to take advantage of the preemption of blue sky registration
requirements provided by Rule 506 of Regulation D. 168 Blue sky laws are state
securities laws that require issuers to comply with additional disclosure and
sometimes merit-based requirements, adding to the costs associated with mak-
ing a securities offering.16 9
The costs associated with making disclosures and with the creation of a fund-
ing platform have garnered criticism, however, from commentators who predict
that these costs combined with the low ceiling for fundraising under Regulation
Crowdfunding will render the exemption too expensive to be worthwhile for
most small companies.170 Nonetheless, Regulation Crowdfunding is ground-
breaking in that it specifically targets smaller investors that have been excluded
164. COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 312.
16s. 17 C. F. R. § 227.201 (a) -(y).
166. Id. § 227.201(t).
167. Crowdfunding Offerings Under Section 4(a)(6), PlAc. L. CORP. & SEC., http://us.practicallaw
.thomsonreuters.com/8-547-34o5 [http://perma.cc/6F5P-Y6RKC].
168. COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 279 (describing how an advantage of Rule 5o6 is that securities
issued under the exemption are not subject to state regulation through registration).
169. Id. at 19. In states with merit-based review requirements, the state has the authority to prevent
a securities offering if it deems that it is unfair or presents excessive risk to investors. Id.
170. See, e.g., id. at 313; Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A
Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending,
102 KY. L.J. 865, 867 (2014).
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from the private company market. Moreover, to the extent that the costs do turn
out to be prohibitive, it is possible that the SEC might amend the caps to make
the exemption more attractive, as it has done in the past with other exemp-
tions."' Thus, Regulation Crowdfunding has created a promising new exemp-
tion from securities registration requirements that could enable small investors
to participate in the art market by investing in art management companies on art
exchanges.
2. Regulation A+
Instead of Regulation Crowdfunding, art companies that want to raise
higher sums of money from investors could use the exemption under Regulation
A+. 172 Regulation A+ has more reporting requirements, but also has greater flex-
ibility and much higher annual fundraising caps. Regulation A+ has two tiers.
Tier 1 has an annual cap of $20 million, while Tier 2 has an annual cap of $50
million."' Neither tier restricts how many unaccredited investors can invest in
the offering, but Tier 2 limits the amount of money an unaccredited investor can
invest to io% of the greater of the investor's annual income or net worth.174 in
terms of ongoing reporting requirements, Tier 2 requires issuers of stock to file
semiannual reports, annual reports, special financial reports, and current re-
ports.17 1 Under Tier 1, issuers only have to file exit reports after the completion
of an offering176 but, unlike Tier 2, Tier 1 does not exempt the offering from state
blue sky laws.177 Under Regulation A+, the only restriction on resale that inves-
171. Regulation A+, in fact, was one such reform effort after the caps under Regulation A were
deemed too low to be useful. Rapp, supra note 41.
172. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (2017). Regulation A+ builds upon the previously existing Regula-
tion A. See COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 322.
173. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1)-(2). Note that there are additional subcaps ($6 million and $15 mil-
lion) for the amount of money that companies can raise from affiliates (people who have a
relationship of control with the issuer, e.g., officers and directors of the company).
174. Id. § 23 0.25 1(d)(2)(C).
175. Id. § 230.257(b)(l)-(4)-
176. Id. § 230.257(a).
177. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules To Facilitate Smaller Com-
panies' Access to Capital, (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49
.html [http://perma.cc/DS2C-B92K] (" [T]he rules provide for the preemption of state secu-
riies law registration and qualification requirements for securities offered or sold to 'qualified
purchasers,' defined to be any person to whom securities are offered or sold under a Tier 2
offering.").
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tors face is that investors selling their shares in the first year after the initial Reg-
ulation A+ offering must not constitute more than 30% of the aggregate offer-
ing.178
In terms of solicitation, companies using Regulation A+ may "test the wa-
ters," soliciting interest from the general public before or after the filing of an
offering statement, provided that the solicitation materials are accompanied by
a preliminary offering circular.1 7 9 The ability to solicit the general public rather
than just accredited investors is one of the major advantages of Regulation A+
over Regulation D.1s0 Under Regulation D, unaccredited investors can generally
only find out about the investment opportunities through interactions with in-
dividuals with whom they have a prior relationship." On top of the limitation
on the number of unaccredited investors that can invest in a Regulation D offer-
ing,182 restrictions on solicitation make it difficult for unaccredited investors to
even hear about such investment opportunities. Being able to solicit the general
public under Regulation A+ would thus make it far easier for art exchanges to
make their offerings known to a broader array of investors. Investors would not
need to have connections to those running the art management companies in
order to find out about potential investment opportunities.
Overall, the biggest rade-off between the two exemptions is that Regulation
Crowdfunding involves fewer disclosure and reporting requirements, while
178. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(3). Note, however, that there are additional resale restrictions for affil-
iates. See Regulation A+: Final Rules Offer Important Capital Raising Alternatives, MORRISON
FOERSTER 9 (Mar. 26, 2015), http://media2.mofo.com/documents/150326regulationa.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TL5J-ZY4E].
179. Regulation 'A+" Offerings Under Amended Regulation A, PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC., http://us
.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-553-7385 [http://perma.cc/Z6TA-KSBQ].
18o. COX ET AL., supra note 119, at 321.
181. After the passage of the JOBS Act, companies and funds using Rule 5o6(c) of Regulation D
can now engage in general solicitation. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule So6 and Rule 144A Offerings: A Small Entity Compliance Guide,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/general-solicitation
-small-entity-compliance-guide.htm [http://perma.cc/X9WK-SB2L]. Rule So6(c) limits the
offering to accredited investors, however. Id. Rule 5o6(b), which allows up to 35 unaccredited
investors to participate, still bans general solicitation. Id. The main safe harbor from general
solicitation is to offer the securities to "a prospective investor with whom the issuer, or a per-
son acting on the issuer's behalf, has a pre-existing, substantive relationship." Question 256.26,
SecuritiesAct Rules: Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules
-interps.htm [http://perma.cc/L34U-YU4E].
182. Rule 5o6(b) of Regulation D allows up to thirty-five unaccredited investors to participate in
the offering, whereas Rule So6(c) does not allow any unaccredited investors to participate.
Rule So6 of Regulation D, supra note 121.
1740
127:1698 2018
UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF ART INVESTMENT VEHICLES
RegulationA+ allows much higher maximum offering amounts ($25 or $50 mil-
lion versus $1.07 million) and fewer restrictions on investors' ability to sell their
shares. Both exemptions, however, greatly expand the potential investor base of
art investment vehicles by allowing an unlimited number of unaccredited inves-
tors to invest in the offerings and allowing for far more liquid shares by greatly
reducing resale restrictions. Thus, these regulatory reforms have paved the way
for the creation of art exchanges by enabling their core features of greater acces-
sibility and liquidity.
CONCLUSION
Past art investment vehicles have largely failed to have a significant impact
on the art market. This Comment has isolated a few of the main challenges fac-
ing art investment vehicles: the illiquidity of the art market, misaligned incen-
tives between art investment vehicles and primary market players, and regula-
tory constraints. Through developing a robust art rental market, creating
mutually beneficial contractual arrangements with primary market players, and
leveraging recent regulatory changes to create art exchanges, more investors will
be able to participate in the art market, and those that do will have access to
higher potential returns and more liquid investment opportunities. Through
these innovations, art investment vehicles can open up the art market to a much
broader array of participants and help unlock the investment potential of high-
end art.
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